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Abstract 
This study examines the use and meaning of ethnic denominations in Hellenistic military 
contexts, both in literature and epigraphy. By analyzing the epigraphic records of the 
settlements which provided soldiers for Hellenistic (and particularly Seleucid) armies, the study 
shows that military units often operated under a single ethnic denomination (i.e. 
“Macedonian”) while including members from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, and thus that 
units’ use of ethnic terminology often represented a preservation of tradition rather than an 
indication of its members’ geographic or genealogical origin.  
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Introduction 
Polybius 5.79: The Armies at the Battle of Raphia, 217 BCE (trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh) 
 
The passage above is part of Polybius’ description of the forces involved in the battle of 
Raphia in 217 BCE. It provides an account of the composition of both forces, including a 
snapshot of the ethnic diversity which characterized the Seleucid force under Antiochus III; we 
see that the army was organized into a variety of ethnically segregated contingents, each 
notarized by its representative ethnonym. This account, and the few others like it with regard 
to the Seleucids’ other major engagements, had previously been regarded as the best source 
Ἀντίοχος δὲ γνοὺς τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν συνῆγε 
τὰς δυνάμεις. ἦσαν δ᾽ αὗται Δάαι μὲν καὶ 
Καρμάνιοι καὶ Κίλικες εἰς τὸν τῶν εὐζώνων 
τρόπον καθωπλισμένοι περὶ πεντακισχιλίους: 
τούτων δ᾽ ἅμα τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶχε καὶ τὴν 
ἡγεμονίαν Βύττακος ὁ Μακεδών. ὑπὸ δὲ 
Θεόδοτον τὸν Αἰτωλὸν τὸν ποιησάμενον τὴν 
προδοσίαν ἦσαν ἐκ πάσης ἐκλελεγμένοι τῆς 
βασιλείας, καθωπλισμένοι δ᾽ εἰς τὸν 
Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, ἄνδρες μύριοι: τούτων 
οἱ πλείονες ἀργυράσπιδες. τὸ δὲ τῆς 
φάλαγγος πλῆθος ἦν εἰς δυσμυρίους, ἧς 
ἡγεῖτο Νίκαρχος καὶ Θεόδοτος ὁ καλούμενος 
ἡμιόλιος. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ 
Πέρσαι τοξόται καὶ σφενδονῆται δισχίλιοι. 
μετὰ δὲ τούτων χίλιοι Θρᾷκες, ὧν ἡγεῖτο 
Μενέδημος Ἀλαβανδεύς. ὑπῆρχον δὲ καὶ 
Μήδων καὶ Κισσίων καὶ Καδουσίων καὶ 
Καρμανῶν οἱ πάντες εἰς πεντακισχιλίους, οἷς 
ἀκούειν Ἀσπασιανοῦ προσετέτακτο τοῦ 
Μήδου. Ἄραβες δὲ καί τινες τῶν τούτοις 
προσχώρων ἦσαν μὲν εἰς μυρίους, 
ὑπετάττοντο δὲ Ζαβδιβήλῳ. 
Antiochus drew his forces together. These 
consisted of Dahae, Carmani, and Cilicians, 
equipped as light-armed troops to the number 
of about five thousand, under the charge and 
command of Byttacus the Macedonian. Under 
Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had deserted 
from Ptolemy, were ten thousand picked men 
from the whole kingdom, armed in the 
Macedonian fashion, most of whom had silver 
shields. The number of the phalanx was 
twenty thousand, and they were led by 
Nicarchus and Theodotus Hemiolius. In 
addition to these there were Agrianes and 
Persians, who were either bowmen or slingers, 
to the number of two thousand. With them 
were a thousand Thracians, under the 
command of Menedemus of Alabanda. There 
was also a mixed force of Medes, Cissians, 
Cadusians, and Carmanians, amounting to 
five thousand men, who were assigned to the 
chief command of Aspasianus the Mede. 
Certain Arabians also and men of 
neighbouring tribes, to the number of ten 
thousand, were commanded by Zabdibelus. 
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for our understanding of the meaning and application of ethnonyms within Hellenistic armies: 
that is to say, what terms like “Macedonian” and “Thracian” actually entailed in military 
contexts. 
The purpose of the present study is to discuss the meaning and application of ethnonyms as 
used to describe military units within the Seleucid army. Its intent is to determine whether the 
Seleucid core military was composed purely of ethnic Macedonians, as some sources seem to 
suggest, or of a variety of ethnicities under the “Macedonian” label. More broadly, it will 
question the content and application of ethnonyms in Hellenistic military contexts in general, 
and suggest that the application of an ethnic label to a military unit is indicative of a particular 
military and cultural tradition rather than genealogy or geographic origin. 
The core of the present discussion is the nature of Hellenistic military ethnonyms, and, 
more specifically, it will be argued that they do not remarkably demarcate the geographic origin 
or bloodlines of the members of any given military unit. That is to say, this study attempts to 
show that a unit labelled as "Macedonians" may well have included members who could claim 
neither a geographic nor genealogic origin in Macedonia. That does not mean, however, that 
the soldiers in question would have been "mislabelled;" they may well have considered 
themselves to be Macedonians by virtue of their participation in a Macedonian unit, or at least 
have been considered in such a way by their (genealogically) Macedonian peers. 
 Erich Gruen has recently argued1  that Greek ethnic identity was considerably more 
malleable than simple questions of origin or bloodline, and that non-Greeks possessed a 
                                                          
1 Gruen, 2013. 
 3  
 
surprising degree of lateral social mobility throughout the classical period, including the ability 
to “become Greek” by association with Greek cultural forms. This recalls Edward Anson’s 
argument2  that it was acquisition of Greek language, and not one’s place of birth, which 
determined whether one could be considered “Greek.” It may be that in this manner, 
association with "Macedonian" military units served as a way for non-Macedonian soldiers to 
"become Macedonian;" we will see below that such units would often maintain a strong 
connections to the cultural orientations of their founding groups, and that members of these 
units were indeed capable of "transitioning" from one ethnic label to another by virtue of their 
service. 
The question of the accuracy of the ethnonyms used by units of the Seleucid military is 
not new, especially with reference to the “Macedonians” of the core phalanx; rather, it has 
been debated fervently for much of the past century. The relevant literary sources are 
contradictory with regard to the genealogies of Seleucid soldiers, the “Macedonian” 
phalangites in particular. Appian refers to the body of the phalanx simply as “the 
Macedonians,”3 seemingly implying an ethnically homogenous body of Macedonian soldiers, 
while Polybius’ description of men “armed in the Macedonian manner”4 has led to the contrary 
conclusion that the term “Macedonian” was merely a military phrase denoting a style of 
armament.  
                                                          
2 Anson, 2009. 
3 Referring to the soldiers of Antiochus III at Magnesia; Appian Syrian War, 32. 
4 See Polybius’s description of, notably, the soldiers of both Ptolemy and Antiochus at the battle of Raphia; 5.82. 
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Unfortunately, Livy’s testimony offers no further clarification; although he refers to the 
soldiers of the Seleucid Empire as “Syrians” rather than “Macedonians” or any sort of simile,5 
his employment of the term is a clear attempt to derogate the Seleucid army (this will be 
discussed in more detail below), and thus his statements sadly cannot offer convincing 
evidence for the presence of Syrians (that is, people who were of Syrian descent) in the 
Seleucid force. Rather, Livy’s terminology should only be seen as a broad generalization that 
does not speak to the identity of the individual groups of soldiers.6 
Scholarly attempts to reconcile these difficulties are numerous. W.W. Tarn famously 
rejected7 the notion that intermarriage within Hellenistic settlements significantly affected the 
Greek population due to their stubborn adherence to their cultural traditions, citing Plutarch’s 
Crassus as the definitive source on the matter due to its clear acknowledgement of “mixed 
Greeks” and implication that they are a social class to themselves. More directly relevant to 
Macedonian soldiers specifically is Guy Griffith’s citation8 of the martial quality of the 
“Macedonians” as demonstrated in Appian’s account of Magnesia and Polybius’ of the parade 
at Daphne as evidence that the troops should not be understood as “Asiatics.” Correspondingly, 
Bezalel Bar-Kochva has dismissed the possibility of the inclusion of indigenous peoples in a 
                                                          
5 Livy identifies the regia ala at that battle of Magnesia as “Syrian;” see Livy 37.40.11. Bar-Kochva’s examination 
(1989, 92-94) of Livy’s reference to these “Syrians” entirely dismisses Livy’s identification, suggesting that these 
soldiers were actually Greco-Macedonian settlers originating from both Macedonia and Anatolia; however, his 
argument rests on the presumption that Livy’s terminology is a corruption of his (non-extant) Polybian source 
material, in which he expects the unit would have been identified as Macedonian. While this conclusion is certainly 
in line with Livy’s assertion that all denizens of the Seleucid Empire had “become Syrian” through their residency 
there (Livy 38.17.11), it remains purely speculative. 
6 For further discussion, see below, chapter 3, 38-40. 
7 Tarn 1938, 35-39. 
8 Griffith 1935, 148-9. 
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Macedonian formation out of hand9 by appealing to the different terminology applied to known 
Asiatic phalangites in our literary sources (i.e. ἐπίγονοι for the Persian youths in Arrian, 
Diodorus, and Plutarch;10 ἀντιταγμα for the Asiatic phalanx of Eumenes in Diodorus11), as well 
as a perceived difference between the shortages of manpower experienced by Alexander and 
Eumenes when these units were formed and the more desirable military situation of the 
Seleucids. By contrast, Getzel Cohen has suggested12 that ethnic terms such as “Macedonian” 
lost their racial or national connotations over time, coming to hold purely military meanings 
(i.e. troops dispositions or fighting styles) no later than the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, and 
Frank Walbank has asserted13 that the term “Macedonian” referred to the fighting style of the 
phalanx and nothing else. 
 Indeed, that ethnonyms could be used in descriptions of Hellenistic forces to denote 
types of armament or combat disposition rather than genealogy is broadly accepted, but that is 
not the extent of my suggestion here; the application of an ethnonym to a military unit in our 
literary sources should not be understood merely as the direct result of a style of combat only. 
Rather, this phenomenon is the result of the preservation of a military tradition, in the same 
way modern military units often maintain a designation despite changes to its membership 
base or even distinct military function.14 Thus, the presence of “Mysian” soldiers at Daphne in 
                                                          
9 Bar-Kochva, 1989, 96-98. 
10 Arrian, Anab. 7.6, Diodorus 17.108.1, Plut. Alex. 71. 
11 Diodorus 17.108.3. 
12 Cohen, 1976, 31. 
13 Walbank, 1957, 1.608. 
14 Such as the maintenance of the iconography of the United States’ famous 101st Airborne division despite its 
transition away from traditional parachuting, or the traditional nomenclature of the Algonquin Regiment of the 
Canadian Reserve Forces stationed in North Bay, Ontario (whose Algonquin population is practically non-existent 
to my understanding); otherwise, we might recall the gradual inclusion of recruits from a variety of ethnic 
backgrounds into the Waffen-SS during the second world war, an observation I owe to professor Robert Porter. 
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166/65 BCE,15 for instance, need not imply a unit of men armed or organized in the same 
manner as those “Mysians” fielded by previous Seleucid kings, but rather an organization of 
soldiers who had, simply, always been known as “Mysians.” Thus, the military ethnonyms 
preserved in our literary sources would be neither representative of the genealogy of a unit’s 
members nor simply an indication of armament, but rather an artifact of the style of 
recruitment employed by the Seleucids (and other Hellenistic regimes), which relied upon 
persistent and self-maintaining regiments settled throughout the empire. 
 This is a study intended to offer a fresh perspective on the matter of ethnicity within 
Seleucid armies by considering developments in Seleucid scholarship that have not yet been 
applied to this topic, such as demographic realities in Hellenistic settler communities and the 
issue of mixed marriages. Like previous studies of the Seleucid army, the present discussion has 
come to rely on our literary sources, as the reality of Hellenistic epigraphic evidence is that it 
presents only a highly lacunose record of individual settlements and, especially, of the military 
groups which resided in them; yet there remain a few pieces of important epigraphic testimony 
which will be discussed here, because—as we shall see—it is from these rare examples that we 
can deduce evidence regarding the relationship of ethnonyms and military units that must 
affect our interpretation of the application of ethnonyms in general, at least in military 
situations. 
 While previous studies of the Seleucid army have focused almost solely on defining 
ethnonyms through their representation in literary texts, the objective here will be to consider 
                                                          
15 See Polybius 5.82, and below, p. 33-4. 
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additional factors in the army’s recruitment that may have skewed the literary usage of ethnic 
terminology. As such, the first chapter of this study will be dedicated to an examination of the 
recruitment system employed by the Seleucid monarchy and its reliance on self-maintaining 
military units settled throughout the empire. This discussion is foundational to the 
interpretation of any literary sources that will be considered further below, and it is presented 
first in order to contextualize the army as it is described by ancient authors. In particular, this 
chapter will focus on the ‘Macedonian’ soldiers employed in the Seleucid kingdom; it is hoped 
that this chapter will demonstrate that the term “Macedonian” represents a changing popular 
body, though it maintains its original ethno-cultural designation through its members’ staunch 
adherence to Macedonian cultural forms. 
 The second chapter will then examine the military institutions installed in colonial 
settlements in the Hellenistic period by both Macedonians and other Hellenistic cultural groups, 
the means by which these institutions preserved their original cultural orientations, and the 
impact of these groups on the ethnonyms preserved in our literary sources. This chapter will 
focus on the relationship of non-literary evidence to these literary ethnonyms; it is here that we 
will discuss a few important epigraphic and papyrological documents that demonstrate the 
nuances available to ethnic labels in military contexts which are not adequately expressed by 
the simple ethnonyms which are used by the ancient authors. The sources presented here are 
not extensive; that is, the few relevant pieces of epigraphy or papyrology presents are not 
numerous enough to plausibly demonstrate a standard practice of military units everywhere in 
the Hellenistic world, and they are not intended to do so. They are intended only to 
demonstrate the relationship of ethnonyms to military service in specific organized units, rather 
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than to genealogy or geographic origin; I do not interpret them as evidence that every military 
ethnonym is a pseudo-ethnic construction, but only as evidence that such labels can be used in 
this way, and thus to suggest that we cannot confidently treat ethnonyms as an indication of 
genealogy or geographic origin in relation to military units. 
 The final chapter will then reconsider the treatment of military ethnonyms by our 
literary sources in the most relevant contexts; that is, the three major deployments of the 
Seleucid regular military at the battles of Raphia and Magnesia, as well as the parade at 
Daphne. These events were chosen because they are the most well-attested deployments of 
Seleucid military force that treat the subject of ethnonyms, and because they provide the 
clearest association of ethnonyms and specific military groups; it is in these narratives of major 
engagements that ethnonyms are attributed to specific military units and thus, they serve as 
the most ripe avenue for any analysis of the actual nature of these labels. It is in this section 
that we shall see the inconsistencies in our sources which undermine any attempt to base 
conclusions on ethnicity in the Seleucid army, including the practice of ethnocentrism or ethnic 
exclusion, on the terminology of authors such as Livy and Polybius. 
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Chapter One: Seleucid Recruitment and Sources of Manpower 
 As discussed above, the overall aim of this paper is to discuss the application of 
ethnonyms in Hellenistic military contexts, and to explore their meanings outside any 
genealogical connection with those to whom they are applied. A necessary part of this 
discussion must entail a response to those scholars who hold that Hellenistic military 
ethnonyms refer to a unit’s genealogical composition and nothing more. To that end, this 
chapter will maintain two foci: first, to elaborate on the foundations of military recruitment in 
the Seleucid empire and better our understanding of the nature of military ethnonyms and 
their application to a broad body of recruits, and second, to underline the demographic realities 
facing the migrant Greco-Macedonians in the eastern Hellenistic kingdoms in order to 
demonstrate the impossibility that the “Macedonians” under Antiochus III and IV were anything 
approaching “pure-blooded.” 
 Of crucial importance to our understanding of military ethnonyms is our understanding 
of the methods by which soldiers and veterans were recruited to serve the Seleucid Empire. 
There has been much discussion as to the nature of the relationship between monarch and 
soldier; the Hellenistic practice of settling towns and forts with groups of soldiers is well known, 
but it has been supposed16 that the soldiers who would be settled in towns and poleis 
throughout the new Hellenistic world represented a fully retired population rather than an 
active fighting force. Yet this seems highly unlikely; we should expect the populace of those 
Seleucid military settlements (especially those broadly identified as “Macedonian”) to have 
                                                          
16 Bouché-Leclercq, 1914, 476. Also see Mittag, 2008, and Scheuble-Reiter, 2012. 
 10  
 
endured some form of military obligation, else we would expect to see the same sort of 
degradation in military quality which is so clearly demonstrated by the less consistently active 
force of Ptolemaic cleruchs.17 Thus, the question of the specific nature of the relationship 
between settled soldier and the Hellenistic monarch remains open. 
 Griffith supposed that this relationship relied on land grants; a soldier would be given a 
parcel of land, a κλῆρος, in return for his oath to serve its granting monarch should the need 
ever arise.18 The city-building activities of the Seleucid kings, Griffith concluded, are therefore 
indicative of their drive to accumulate manpower; the establishment of communities of military 
settlers (κάτοικοι19) was often a royal effort to establish settlements which could serve as a 
reliable source of professional forces, accomplished through the exchange of land for military 
service. 
 Indeed, the assertion that the Seleucid monarchs depended on disparate settlement 
groups indebted to their service by virtue of land holdings is well supported; Briant has 
convincingly interpreted the various references to Seleucid units being dismissed to a variety of 
disparate lands as indicative of this sort of recruitment process,20 and the recruitment of the 
famous Silver Shields is described by Polybius in a similar manner.21 The same is implied for the 
                                                          
17 For the sedentary lifestyle of Ptolemaic cleruchs and a resulting degradation of military ability, see Griffith, 1935, 
117, cf. Polybius 5.62.7-8. It remains a possibility that the veterans themselves would no longer be active, but 
merely be responsible for the oversight and training of new recruits; this would still require us to understand the 
military colonies as a primary supplier of Seleucid military manpower, and thus would not change the present 
discussion.  
18 Griffith, 1935, 150-154; 157-9. For a similar system at work in the Ptolemaic realms, cf. Lesquier, 1911, 230. 
19 This is the most commonly recognized terminology for Hellenistic military settlers, though its use does not 
universally suggest that those to whom it was applied were soldiers; see Cohen, 1991. 
20 Briant, 1978, with specific reference to the cavalry drawn from the eastern satrapies. 
21 Polybius 5.79; see above, p. 2, and below, p. 36, 37. 
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regular soldiers stationed in Antioch before the rule of Demetrius II, who were dismissed “each 
to their own land” upon Demetrius’ arrival and replaced with a mercenary-only army.22 
 Yet this position is not wholly satisfactory. Cohen cites23 a document from Dura (P. Dura 
12) as evidence against the association of all Seleucid κλῆροι with military obligation due to its 
indication that women were able to inherit them. He admits that the application of its contents 
to Seleucid colonisation is not definitive as the document itself is quite late (3rd century CE), 
but maintains that the inscription presents an important consideration in this regard as Dura’s 
relevant legal framework would likely have been established in the Seleucid period, and the 
concept of the military nature of κλῆροι in the Seleucid sphere is not supported directly at all.  
 We need not, however, fully discard the κλῆρος as a source of Seleucid military 
manpower. Not only is Cohen’s criticism dependant on documentation which is too late to 
apply to the Seleucid realm, but moreover we know that Seleucid land grants could potentially 
be granted with an accompanying military obligation; we know, for example, that this practice 
was actively employed by Antiochus III, who settled two thousand Jewish families in Phrygia 
and Lydia to control the region.24 Though Bickerman25 doubted the military purpose of the 
settlers, I follow Bar-Kochva in the interpretation of these settlers as garrisoning soldiers due 
both to the clearly military intention of Antiochus’ resettlement practice and the otherwise 
attested employment of Babylonian Jews by the Seleucid military.26 In addition. we cannot 
                                                          
22 1 Macc. 11.38 
23 Cohen, 1978, 51. 
24 Jos. Ant. 12.247-53 
25 Bikerman, 1938, 85-6. 
26 Jos. Ant. 12.119; see Bar-Kochva 1976, 5-7. 
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ignore the inscription from Magnesia (I.Magnesia 1 = OGIS 229) which clearly attests to the 
holding of κλῆροι by military settlers:27 
OGIS 229; Ihnken 1978, 1; Trans. Austin, 
2006, 174 
The treaty of sympolitea between Smyrna 
and Magnesia-ad-Sipylus ca. 245 BCE: 
[35-38] … οἱ ἐμ Μαγνησίαι κάτοικοι οἵ τε 
κατὰ πόλιν ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς 
ὑπαίθροις καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκηταί... 
[100-103]… δεδόχθαι πολίτας τε αὐτοὺς εἶν 
καὶ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ ὅσα καὶ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις πολίταις ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούς τε κήρους 
αὐτῶν τοὺς δύο, ὅν τε ὁ θεὸς καὶ σωτὴρ 
Ἀντίοχος ἐπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ περὶ ο 
Ἀλέξανδρος γεγράφηκεν, εἶναι αὐτοῖς 
ἀδεκατεύτους, καὶ ἐὰν προσορισθῇ ἡ χώρα, 
ἣν ἔχουσιν οἱ πρότερον ὄντες ἐμ Μαγνησίαι 
κάτοικοι, τῆι πόλει τῆι ἡμετέραι… 
… The settlers in Magnesia, both the 
cavalry and the infantry in the city as well as 
those in the field and the other inhabitants… 
.. be it resolved that they should enjoy the 
same right as the other citizens, and that 
their two lots, the one granted to the by 
Antiochus (I) Theos Soter and the one about 
which Alexander wrote, should be exempt 
from the tithe…. 
 
 Indeed, the possibility of a κλῆρος passing into the ownership of a woman does not 
necessarily preclude its use by the monarchy as a source of military manpower, albeit perhaps 
not in every case in which the distribution of κλῆροι are attested (in any case, such ownership 
may always have rested on the condition of providing a son or second husband of military age 
to the crown28). Still, it remains that to assume all κλῆροι carried military duties with them 
would be to overextend our evidence. 
                                                          
27 Bar-Kochva (1976, 21) sees SEG VII.13 (an elegy, ca. 7-2 BCE, in honor of Zamaspes (stratiarchos of Susa) which 
expresses gratitude for his irrigation programs) as evidence of the same practice at Susa, arguing that the elegy’s 
late (Parthian) date is irrelevant as the settlers there would have been descended from those settled by the 
Seleucids or even Alexander: … ἀνθ’ ὧν μιν μεγάλης ἄκρας φρουροὶ ναετῆ[ρ]ες ἔστασαν μνήμαις ἄφθιτον 
ἐσσομένοις, τῶν κλήρους ἀνέσωσε πάλαι λειφθέντας ἀ[νύδρους] νάμασι Γονδείσου καρποφόρους θέμενος. 
28 This suggestion is Cohen’s; 1978, 51-2. He argues that the inheritance of a κλῆρος by a woman may still have 
carried military obligation, to be fulfilled perhaps by her children or other close family; she may have even been 
free to arrange for its fulfilment by, effectively, anyone. Regardless, although the preceding arguments are 
speculative, Griffith argues (1935, 158-159) that the provisions for the inheritance of κλῆροι by women are not so 
conclusive as we might think, as the Seleucid monarchy would have been effectively bound by traditional Greek 
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 A convincing alternative was suggested by Bikerman, who speculated that the Seleucids 
recruited soldiers through regional conscription from the military colonies; soldiers would be 
recruited on the basis of their residence, not necessarily in exchange for any land ownership, 
effectively becoming levies. Correspondingly, Cohen has pointed to a collection of epigraphic 
sources which disclose the existence of organized groups of self-governing soldiers which 
collectively composed a significant political force throughout Seleucid territory.29 These groups 
(κοινά or “lodges” as Cohen labels them) could not only play a leading role in their settlements’ 
local politics, but also represent active military units which were responsible for the 
maintenance of their own military effectiveness (i.e. equipment maintenance and, crucially, 
recruitment).30 Following Bikerman and Cohen, Capdetrey has recently concluded that, unlike 
Ptolemaic cleruchies, Seleucid settlements (and the land grants by which they were partially 
composed) maintained both a military and civilian character, and that only a portion of any 
given settler community was likely involved in military service (but that this military relationship 
was quite common among Seleucid settlers).31 I would argue that these suggestions together 
represent the most plausible reconstructions of the recruitment of non-mercenary Hellenistic 
forces: soldiers may indeed have been bound to military service through the possession of land, 
but this may not have represented a contract with the reigning monarch, but rather with 
                                                          
law to allow for the provisioning of a soldier’s immediate family in the event of their death, and points out that 
instances of such female inheritance are only very rarely attested (only one was known at the time, 159 n. 2, cf. 
Sachau, 1911 no. 30, and that is of very early (Achaemenid) date). 
29 Cohen, 1978, 76-83. See also Tarn, 8; Bickerman, 1938, 82 and Oertel, 1921, 10.  
30 Cohen (1978, 52, 76, 82) argues that soldiers were recruited not only on the basis of their residency in a 
particular region, but specifically on the basis of their participation in a region's local military association. For 
further discussion on the military organizations behind such associations, see Billows, 1995, 151 regarding the 
apparent settlement of soldiers with officers with whom they had previously served, indicating the settlement of 
full units intact. For the involvement of koina with their settlements' political activities, Cohen cites the role played 
by the association of Magnesia in the negotiation of sympolity with Smyrna (77-8). 
31 Capdetrey, 2007, 158-66. 
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regional military organizations which were responsible for their own military effectiveness. This 
would explain, for instance, full admission to the so-called “Mysian” unit in Fayyum being 
coincident on a receipt of a κλῆρος.32 
 These associations and the implications of their membership will be discussed in much 
greater detail in the following chapter; for the time being, our focus will remain on the core 
ethnic groups from which these associations often derived their identities, as these groups 
appear to have maintained individual ethnonyms in the same way modern military units 
maintain iconography and regalia. In particular, it is crucial to examine here the factors 
influencing the maintenance of a strong ‘Macedonian’ population of soldiers within a group so 
identified (though the concept conceivably applies to any group deriving its name from a 
particular ethnicity). As we will see, it is difficult to reasonably expect such groups to maintain 
the sort of “pure” ethnic compositions which Bar-Kochva claims, as such a phenomenon would 
require a much greater degree of civilian migration from Macedonia proper than is evinced to 
be feasible. 
 Indeed, it does not appear that the migrant population flowing from Greece and 
Macedon into the Hellenistic kingdoms was so composed as to allow the establishment of a 
self-sustaining Greco-Macedonian population in the purest sense. As demonstrated by C. A. 
La’da, Ptolemaic papyrological records indicate a strong male bias in the immigrant 
Macedonian population, leading to frequent intermarriage with the local Egyptian populace 
                                                          
32 I reference here the advancement of the career of one Theotimos, who was admitted into the ranks of the 
Mysian cavalry at Fayyum upon receipt of a parcel of land in 103 BCE. This example will be discussed in more detail 
below, p. 51. 
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rather than the establishment of fully Macedonian households.33 Though there is no such clear 
evidence to support any similar conclusions in regards to the Seleucid kingdom, the difficulties 
faced by the Seleucids in encouraging even purely military migration from the Greek peninsula 
have been noted,34 and so it is difficult to imagine Seleucid lands enjoying a more stable civilian 
Macedonian population than the Ptolemaic. This implies, therefore, that military colonies 
would, by necessity, come to depend either on the recruitment of local peoples or children of 
mixed marriages. 
 Mixed marriages among garrisoned soldiers could hardly have been ubiquitous, 
however; there must have been concerns regarding the status (legal and social) of local women 
which would have precluded this practice from becoming universal, as illustrated comically by 
Plautus.35 With that said, the realities of life in a garrison could lead to such concerns being 
disregarded or at least tempered,36 and we know that this phenomenon occurred extensively in 
certain regions37 including Syria, wherein the children of Greco-Macedonian fathers and Syrian 
mothers would be considered “Greek” and could inherit military κλῆροι.38 
 Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the stability of military immigration from 
the Aegean into the Seleucid empire; ca. 16,000 Macedonians are understood to have settled in 
Asia generally by 319 BCE,39 but beyond this date records for immigration into Asia are non-
                                                          
33 La’da, 2002; cf. Scheidel, 2004, 24-5. For a parallel with regard to the Galatians of Asia Minor, see Coşkun, 2013. 
34 See below, p. 28. 
35 Miles Gloriosus, act IV; cf. Chaniotis, 2002, 110-12. 
36 See Ogden, 1998, 76f. 
37 Launey, 1949, 714 and Mélèze-Modrzejewski, 1984, 353-376 on mixed marriages in Hellenistic Egypt. 
38 Andrade, 2013, 42; Martinez-Sève, 2009, 136-37; Briant, 1982; Cohen, 1978, 85-86. 
39 Billows, 1995, ch.7; Scheidel, 2001; Fischer-Bovet, 2007, 10. 
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existent. It is interesting to note, however, Bagnall’s observation40 that military units 
demarcated by ethnonym in the Ptolemaic realm could continue to grow even in the absence of 
significant immigration from their homeland, and in fact that a greater number of Ptolemaic 
cleruchs appear to have been descended from an original settler group which received little 
further reinforcement through immigration.41 This implies, of course, that immigration was not 
a necessary condition for the maintenance of ethnic traditions by the cleruchies; and thus, we 
should not expect it to be a necessary condition for the maintenance of military traditions in 
the Seleucid realm, either.42  
 If we can accept that Greco-Macedonian immigration would not likely have provided a 
stable community of “Macedonian” soldiers within Hellenistic armies, we must then wonder as 
to the eventual fate of the “Macedonian” communities which formed the foundation of the 
military societies contributing to these forces. In this regard, a brief examination of the 
“Argyraspides,” the famous Seleucid elite infantry, may prove telling; the mythos surrounding 
the fabled unit held that their members were well-nigh immortal, maintaining a stable 
membership and fighting prowess well into the old age of each soldier. We read the following 
in Diodorus (19.41): 
καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν τῶν 
ἀργυρασπίδων οἱ νεώτατοι μὲν περὶ τὰ 
ἑξήκοντα ἔτη, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων οἱ πλείους μὲν περὶ 
τὰ ἑβδομήκοντα, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πρεσβύτεροι, 
πάντες δὲ ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις καὶ ταῖς ῥώμαις 
ἀνυπόστατοι: τοσαύτη περὶ αὐτοὺς ἦν εὐχειρία 
καὶ τόλμα διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κινδύνων. 
At this time the youngest of the Silver 
Shields were about sixty years old, most of 
the others about seventy, and some even 
older; but all of them were irresistible 
because of experience and strength, such 
was the skill and daring acquired through 
the unbroken series of their battles. 
                                                          
40 Bagnall, 1984, 10-12. 
41 Roughly two-thirds of the cleruchs counted by Uebel, 1968. 
42 For further discussion, see Mitchell, forthcoming 2016. 
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Of course, we might reasonably find this assertion difficult to believe, and there is evidence to 
the contrary to be found in Polybius. Far from a stable unit roster of Macedonian men, Polybius 
tells us (5.79.4) that the Argyraspides were a unit whose ranks not only required replenishment 
with new recruits, but that these recruits came from a variety of geographic sources: 
ὑπὸ δὲ Θεόδοτον τὸν Αἰτωλὸν τὸν 
ποιησάμενον τὴν προδοσίαν ἦσαν ἐκ πάσης 
ἐκλελεγμένοι τῆς βασιλείας, καθωπλισμένοι 
δ᾽ εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, ἄνδρες 
μύριοι: τούτων οἱ πλείονες ἀργυράσπιδες.  
Under Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had 
deserted from Ptolemy, were ten thousand 
picked men from the whole kingdom, armed 
in the Macedonian fashion, most of whom 
had silver shields. 
 
We can thus see that, despite the varied nature of the Argyraspides’ recruiting base, the unit 
was maintained on the basis of a military tradition which predated its actual membership; in 
other words, it was quite important that the Argyraspides always be seen as “the 
Argyraspides,” and that any new blood entering the unit maintained the esprit de corps for 
which the unit had become known. It was this military tradition, and not the actual genealogy 
of the force’s members, which defined its identity. 
It is quite likely that the foundational bodies of these types of units, whatever ethnonym 
they adhered to, were indeed homogenous groups. We cannot, however, confidently assert 
that these groups were capable of maintaining homogeneity through the generations; this 
would require us to believe that these original groups had maintained a population large 
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enough to represent a significant body of military manpower by the time of Daphne.43 As 
Rachel Mairs has demonstrated with respect to the Hellenistic east, the maintenance of 
Macedonian cultural forms is less evidence for a stable Macedonian population and more 
evidence for an acceptance of these cultural forms.44 In this case, Mairs’ position appears 
directly relevant: the “Macedonians” of Antiochus’ review at Daphne, for example, are unlikely 
to have been homogenously ethnic Macedonians for demographic reasons, but rather a body of 
men of indeterminate origin who had become part of a Macedonian military association which 
had existed in their settlement for some time. 
 It is an important distinction to make, however, that these would not have been 
“Macedonian” units by virtue of their tactical forms only; Cohen himself has discerned that the 
military associations present in Hellenistic colonies would serve an important role in preserving 
the culture of its founding group.45 These are not merely groups of “Asiatics” fighting in the 
Macedonian style, but rather groups of men who had come to actively participate in—and 
indeed assume— Macedonian cultural identity, as I shall demonstrate below. 
  
                                                          
43 In any event, intermarriage between Hellenistic military settlers and local women is simply far too well-attested 
to be anything other than expected in this regard. See Vatin, 1970, esp. 137; Tarn, 1938, 34-9. For this practice as 
early as Alexander, cf. Justin 12.4. 
44 Mairs, 2006. Mairs contends that the concept of ethnicity in the Hellenistic world was malleable, and as such 
that the archaeological record which seems to represent distinct residential areas within cities for people of 
differing cultures is misleading. It is Mairs’ position that ethnicity in this period and region was largely defined by 
the cultural institutions one participated in and, therefore, changing one’s social behavior could effectively change 
one’s ethnicity over time; she therefore concludes that urban remains which were once thought to signify 
segregated Greco-Macedonian and Bactrian populations in cities like Ai Khanoum may actually represent 
segregated cultural spheres populated by people of either race. 
45 Cohen, 1978, 82. 
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Chapter Two: The Impact of the Seleucid Recruitment System on Military Ethnonyms 
 As previously addressed, our best insights into the ethnic composition of the Seleucid 
force are given by Polybius, Livy and Appian, through their accounts of the battles of Raphia and 
Magnesia respectively, as well as Polybius’s account46 of the military parade held by Antiochus 
IV at Daphne. These accounts appear to describe a force whose units are quite clearly 
demarcated on lines of ethnicity, but as discussed in the previous chapter, this clarity is 
unsurprisingly misleading. The focus of this chapter will be to examine the impact of the 
methods of recruitment employed by the Seleucid army on the use and application of 
ethnonyms in Hellenistic military contexts. In short, I will argue that the Seleucid army’s 
reliance on self-administering military units which maintained traditional ethnonyms would 
lead to these ethnonyms being associated with recruits from a variety of geographic and 
cultural backgrounds. 
 This style of recruitment, which was discussed in the previous chapter, therefore led to 
the under-(or mis-)representation of certain ethnic groups in our primary literary sources for 
the army’s composition, as it would have obscured the genealogy of the various participants of 
these groups in favor of the ethnonym maintained by the group as a whole; we will see that 
such units often seem to have referred to themselves by a single ethnonym despite the 
inclusion of individuals of differing ethnic backgrounds. 
 To explore this assertion, we will consider a few inscriptions which illustrate the 
association of an ethnic moniker (including "Macedonian") with an organized military 
                                                          
46 Based on Athenaios, 194c-195f. 
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association within a settlement. These inscriptions attest to the ethno-cultural traditions of 
these groups; a garrison force could be identified by an ethnonym, presumably dependent on 
the genealogy or geographic origin of its original members, which would establish a tradition 
which would persist within the group despite the eventual inclusion of new members who did 
not identify with its founding ethnonym (which will be discussed further below). 
 We know of a number of epigraphic records of garrison forces identified by a specific 
ethnonym; several settlements in Asia Minor demonstrably maintained populations which self-
identified as “Macedonians” long after their original foundation (e.g. Nakrasa47 and Doidye48), 
indicating that the remaining soldier populations had maintained this identity despite 
intermarriage with the local populace.49 A clear example of this style of self-identification is 
demonstrated at Thyatira in the third century: 
OGIS 211. An early third-century dedicatory inscription 
to Seleukos I: 
… τῶν ἐν Θυατείρᾳ Μακεδόνων οἱ ἡγεμόνες 
καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται...  
The leaders and the soldiers of the 
Macedonians in Thyatira… 
  
BCH 11, 466.32. A small stone containing only the 
identification of the garrison around 
Thyateira, dated to the reign of Seleukos I 
(306-281 BCE) 
… οἱ περὶ Θυάτειρα Μακεδόνες… 
 
… The Macedonians around Thyatira… 
 
                                                          
47 OGIS 268; CIG 3522. 
48 OGIS 314 
49 Which, as was explored in the previous chapter, would have represented a demographic necessity. For the 
maintenance of military tradition in these settlements in particular, see Griffith, 1935, 151. 
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 The association of the term “Macedonian” with professional military associations is also 
evident papyrologically, as we know of a few pieces of evidence which attest to the careers of 
members of military associations whose epithet featured the ethnonym “Macedonian” 
alongside their military definitions, such as one Lysanias of Hiera Nesos who is identified as one 
of the “infantry of the Macedonians.”50 This usage of the term "Macedonian" was enough to 
lead Launey and Uebel to conclude that the ethnonym had come to represent only a pseudo-
ethnonym (though Launey cautioned that this would not be the case in each usage),51 as it was 
tied to a military role and not, apparently, to a particular genealogy. 
 These theories, however, depended on the absence of any recognized connection 
between ethnic tradition and military service in the Hellenistic world; Launey, for instance, 
believed that the application of the term "Macedonian" revealed only that a soldier primarily 
fought as a phalangite, while the reality of the term's application is more socially complex than 
military armament alone. At the very least, it often appears to refer to a soldier’s participation 
in an organized unit which identified as a group with the ethnonym in question. 
 Direct evidence for this phenomenon is provided by a selection of inscriptions included 
below, which contain references not only to a garrison with an ethnic moniker, but also an 
indication of their inclusion of members that did not identify with their namesake ethnonym. 
Each of these pieces involves the self-identification of a military group with a primary ethnic 
moniker as well as an indication that only part of its membership could claim such an identity 
                                                          
50 PPt 8919; ca. 244-43 BCE, cf. Uebel, 1968, no. 90. For further examples of the usage of the term “Macedonian” 
to denote a settler’s military occupation, cf. Uebel nos. 344, 398, 1184, and 1322. 
51 Launey, 1949, 321-22; Uebel, 1968, 59 n.4. 
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(these groups are usually referred to as συμπολιτευόμενοι, and are not identified with any 
minority ethnic52). These inscriptions thus attest to the eventual inclusion of local indigenous 
people in an ethnically-demarcated military association to which they did not relate 
genealogically (or, more broadly, the inclusion of the general populace in an otherwise 
specifically labelled unit. Admittedly, the local origin of these new recruits cannot be 
demonstrated: it would simply represent the most convenient source of replenishment for a 
garrison force). 
OGIS 143 The “Thracians” of Cyprus; an honorific 
inscription to Ptolemy, governor of Cyprus, 
ca. 150-100 BCE. 
τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν Κύπρωι τασσομένων 
Θραικῶν καὶ τῶν συμπολιτευομένων… 
The association of Thracians stationed in 
Cyprus and those living with them... 
 
OGIS 145 The Cypriot “Ionians;” this inscription 
appears to be similar in context to OGIS 143 
although the first lines of the inscription are 
lost (ca. 150-100) BCE: 
τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν τῆι νήσωι τασσομένων 
᾿Ιώνων καὶ τῶν συμπολιτευομένων… 
The association of Ionians stationed on the 
island and those living with them… 
 
SEG II.871 The “Boeotians” of Xoei, near Alexandria; an 
honorific inscription dated to the reign of 
Ptolemy VI (180-145 BCE): 
οἱ̣ ἐ̣πισυνηγμένοι ἐν Ξόει Βοιωτο̣ὶ̣ καὶ ο̣ἱ̣ 
συμπολιτευόμενοι…. 
The Boeotians gathered together in Xoei and 
those living with them….. 
 
 
                                                          
52 For discussion of the inclusion of συμπολιτευόμενοι as a demographic necessity for the maintenance of military 
effectiveness on the part of garrison groups, see Cohen, 1978, 76-83. See also Lesquier, 1911, 120-24, who has 
demonstrated that the ethnic Mysian originally denoted origin but came to represent only tactical disposition and 
armament by the second century BCE as a variety of soldiers in “Mysian” units could be demonstrably linked to 
other ethnic origins (i.e. Cretans, Persians, and even Macedonians). 
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SB I 1106 The “Macedonians” of Sebennytos; a 
dedicatory inscription of a Macedonian 
garrison in the Nile Delta: 
οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γυμνασίου τοῦ Ἡρακλείου 
Μακεδόνες καὶ ἡγεμόνες καὶ ἒχῳ τάξεων καὶ 
οἱ συνπολιτευόμενοι.... 
The Macedonians from the gymnasium of 
Herakleios, and the leaders and officers from 
the ranks and those living with them.53 
 
 OGIS 143 and 145 are Cypriot, and admittedly Ptolemaic, though still relevant at 
present; they are extracts of dedicatory inscriptions in the name of two military associations, 
the Thracians and Ionians respectively, which identify their patron groups by those particular 
ethnic monikers alone. SEG II.871, another Ptolemaic example, is an Alexandrian dedicatory 
inscription established by a military association of “Boeotians.” Indeed, it appears that such 
groups would typically associate themselves with their (presumably) dominant or founding 
ethnicity, whether Macedonian in Thyatira or Thracian on Cyprus. But most relevant here are 
the references to the various smaller groups identified within the structure of some of these 
groups, as the inscriptions also make clear that these ethnics are not comprehensive 
statements of the groups’ members. We see in the Cypriot inscriptions of the Thracian and 
Ionian κοινά, as well as the πολίτευμα of the Egyptian Boeotians, that these groups could 
include soldiers who did not individually identify with their dominant ethnicity. Each of these 
dedications identify their respective associations as inclusive of others who cannot be identified 
as Thracian or Ionian themselves—though they are their “co-habitants,” συμπολιτευόμενοι, 
                                                          
53 Van’t Dack (1984, 1329) connects the sympoliteuomenoi with the garrison at large rather than any civic 
association at Herakleios; Honigman (2003, 29 n. 31) places these soldiers as garrison troops at Sebennytos in the 
delta, and only relates them to Herakleios through the gymnasium. 
 24  
 
they are not yet Thracians, Ionians, or Boeotians proper. The membership of these individuals 
within the referred organizations is implied by their inclusion in the same genitive phrases 
which identify the associations with their dominant ethnicities. The cited Thracian association, 
for example, does not dedicate their inscription by “the κοινόν of Thracians and also by those 
living with them,” but rather by “the κοινόν composed of Thracians and those living with 
them.” The distinct implication, previously noted by Cohen,54 appears to be that people who 
could not otherwise identify as Thracian could yet be admitted to and included in this κοινόν.55
 This practice does not appear to be confined to Cyprus, or even specifically to these 
associations; the cited record of the Ptolemaic Boeotian association indicates that this group 
included συμπολιτευόμενοι as well despite its particular ethnonym.56 A further notable 
example is the garrison at Palaemagnesia in Asia Minor, wherein a group of Persian soldiers 
undergo sympolity alongside others, though it is the primary group which is not identified: 
OGIS 229; Ihnken 1978, 1; Trans. Austin, 
2006, 174 
The treaty of sympolitea between Smyrna 
and Magnesia-ad-Sipylus ca. 245 BCE: 
ὑπάρχειν δὲ καὶ Ὠμάνει καὶ τοῖς Πέρσαις τοῖς 
ὑπὸ Ὠμάνην καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σμύρνης 
ὰποσταλεῖσιν ἐπὶ τὴν φυλαχὴν τοῦ χωρίου, 
Μενεκλεῖ τε καὶ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸν τασσομένοις, 
τήν τε πολιτεία[ν] καὶ τάλλα φιλάνθρωπα ἂ 
καὶ τοῖς ἐκγ Μαγνησιας ἐψήφισται, κ[αὶ] 
προνοῆσαι τὸν δῆμον ὅπως αὺτοῖς διδῶται 
ἐκ βασιλικοῦ τά τε ματρήματα καὶ τὰ ὀψώνια 
τἆλλα ὅσα ἐώθει ἐκ βασιλικοῦ δίδοσθαι 
αὐτοῖς. 
Omanes and the Persians under Omanes and 
the men sent from Smyrna to guard the fort, 
Menecles and those under his command, 
shall be granted citizenship and the other 
privileges which have been voted to the 
others from Magnesia, and the people will 
see to it that they are given from the royal 
treasury their rations and pay and everything 
else which is normally given to them from the 
royal treasury. 
                                                          
54 Cohen, 1978, p. 74. 
55 Arthur Megaw has argued that a similar practice, though using different terminology, is evident in the epigraphy 
surrounding a Lycian regiment stationed on Cyprus near the close of Ptolemaic rule of the island (ca. 40/39 BCE); 
though the decrees of this regiment refer to the inclusion of parepilykoi, a pseudo-ethnic which he equates to the 
sympoliteuomenoi mentioned by the Ionian and Thracian units. Megaw, 2007, 372-3. 
56 See above, SB I 1106, p. 24. 
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 These inscriptions are perhaps the most telling pieces of evidence for the ability of the 
Hellenistic military colony to obscure the genealogy and origins of the local populaces of 
garrisoned regions. If a settlement included a military association which identified with a single 
ethnonym (as with the "Thracians" of OGIS 143) and that association recruited from the local 
populace, then this would serve as a mechanism by which a collective body of soldiers of 
various genealogies would come to be known by a single ethnonym. The associations cited 
above, and their methods of epigraphic self-identification, demonstrate the capacity for such 
groups to display a primary ethnic moniker (“Thracians,” “Ionians,” “Macedonians”) while 
admitting members who were not of their titular ethnic origin. Thus, we might understand the 
Seleucid “Macedonians” or “Thracians” present in the accounts of the army’s roster in our 
historians as referring to a body of men bearing these identities despite varying genealogic or 
geographic origins. It seems most likely that these associations would maintain their traditional 
ethnonym as their active military roster changed, expecting new recruits to conform to its 
established traditions, as will be discussed shortly below. 
 The malleability of ethnic identity in the face of military service is further illustrated 
papyrologically, through the career of one Dionysios Kephalas a Ptolemaic soldier whose career 
can be (at least partially) determined through the extant receipts of transactions involving his 
land;57 in 112 BCE, Dionysios was an active soldier called a “Persian,” an ethnonym which 
persisted through 109 when he was promoted to serve as his unit’s rearguard captain. In 108, 
however, the ethnonym is no longer attached to his name, instead having been replaced by the 
                                                          
57 The various sources for this are discussed by Launey, 1949, 325-26, along with further comment on the 
phenomenon. 
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epithet “Macedonian.”58 Though we lack details on the association or military unit in which 
Dionysios served--which curiously involved both the Persian and Macedonian ethnonyms--the 
point remains that Dionysios was capable of transitioning from being "Persian" to being 
"Macedonian" by virtue of his military service and his position. 
 These units offered an avenue for indigenous involvement in the Greco-Macedonian 
military (and thus cultural) sphere which our sources do not adequately represent. Bar-Kochva 
has already noted the conspicuous absence of Syrians and Persians in our sources for the 
composition of the Seleucid military.59 We do have a scant few exceptional examples against 
this trend; Polybius gives reference to a unit of Persians serving alongside units of Agrianian and 
Thracian light infantry under a commander Menedemus at the battle of Raphia.60 Of immediate 
note is the exceptional presence of identified Persian soldiers at all, but also important is their 
presence alongside Thracian soldiers if we accept that the Thracian soldiers were locally raised 
in the region of Persis. The origin of these Thracians is admittedly uncertain; Griffith61 interprets 
these soldiers simply as Thracian mercenaries, while Launey62 suggests that they are the 
descendants of Thracian settlers in Asia Minor established by either the Seleucids or Alexander 
himself. However, both suggestions seem untenable, as forces from both Thrace proper and 
                                                          
58 See also Launey (1949, 326 n. 3) who describes a similar phenomenon affecting another soldier, Hermophilos. 
59 Bar-Kochva 1976, 52, rejects the previously dominant explanation for this absence—that the general 
contemporary opinion in the Seleucid kingdom and the ancient world at large held that Syrians and those of 
Iranian descent were “effeminate and soft”(cf. Launey, 1949, I.536, referencing Livy 35.49.8 and Plut. Moral. 
197c)—but suggests an original explanation that is purely speculative: citing the critical importance of the regions 
in question to the Seleucid administration (a matter now in dispute; see below, n. 72), he proposes that the 
Seleucids simply saw “arming the Syrians” as too risky an endeavor and thus refrained from doing so, especially in 
light of the great concentrations of military colonies housing Macedonian military resources. 
60 Polybius 5.79.6: “πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ Πέρσαι τοξόται καὶ σφενδονῆται δισχίλιοι. μετὰ δὲ τούτων χίλιοι 
Θρᾷκες, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Μενέδημος Ἀλαβανδεύς.” 
61 Griffith, 1935, 143. 
62 Launey, 1949, 378. 
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Anatolia would have been inaccessible to Antiochus III due to their being under the control of 
Ptolemy IV and Achaios at this time; the most likely suggestion is that the Persians, Agrianians, 
and Thracians were each raised from the region of Persis, made by Bar-Kochva63 on the basis of 
their sharing of a common commander.64 Thus, we can confidently accept that the Persians 
mentioned by Polybius are interesting not only due to their exceptional nature among ethnic 
groups in the Seleucid military, but also because they appear to represent a unit identified by 
its specific military tradition and not solely its ethnicity, as clearly applies to the Thracians and 
Agrianians they serve beside.65 
 However, it remains that these populations are left largely unaccounted for in our major 
sources for the composition of the Seleukid force. Of course, it is hardly unanimously accepted 
that these sources of manpower were left fully untapped. Bar-Kochva’s dismissal of the 
involvement of Iranian-born soldiers in the phalanx is not total, as he does suggest66 that the 
portion of the army’s recruiting base centered in Anatolia may have drawn from Iranian-
descended soldiers possibly descended from Achaemenid settlers. With respect to the royal 
army in full, Billows considers67 the involvement of Asiatics, including Syrians and 
Mesopotamians, in the “Macedonian” regiments of the army an inevitability, and Sherwin-
                                                          
63 Bar-Kochva, 1976, p. 50. These soldiers would likely have represented men recruited from their namesake lands 
in prior years and later settled in or around (and supplied by) the region of Persis. 
64 Dumitru, 2013, while ultimately undecided, has also conceded (p. 355) that the presence of soldiers recruited 
from the Seleucid east is much more believable than western-raised troops due to Antiochus III’s recent 
campaigning against Molon. Furthermore, we know through Diodorus (19.27.5) and Polyaenus (7.40) of a Thracian 
military settlement in Persis, which lends further credence to Bar-Kochva’s suggestion. 
65 On the usage of the term “Persian” as demarcation of a military disposition rather than ethnicity in Ptolemaic 
Egypt, see Lesquier, 1911, 106ff. This is quite contrary to the relative proliferation of the ethnic “Persian” in 
Ptolemaic military records; cf. Fischer-Bovet, 2014, 90-99. 
66 Bar-Kochva, 1976, p. 43. 
67 Billows, 1995, 157. 
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White and Kuhrt consider68 the treaty between Magnesia and Smyrna (OGIS 229) as evidence of 
direct Persian participation in the phalanx.69 In any case, the relative dearth of military 
manpower70 faced by the Seleucids gives us reason to expect that they would have been 
mobilised whenever needed; thus, we are left wondering as to their absence in our literary 
accounts. 
 It is unlikely that there is a universal explanation for the phenomenon; it would be too 
much to assume that every recruiting body and every military garrison operated in the same 
manner throughout the empire. But it now seems at least likely that one contributing factor is 
that organized associations of soldiers of the sort just discussed (who identified with various 
                                                          
68 Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, 1993, 53-9. 
69 Tuplin is more skeptical, dismissing the Persians at Palaemagnesia as significant in any respect (2014, pp. 18) due 
to the inscription’s failure to specify their role in the garrison and its structure; he cautiously accepts a limited role 
of Iranian soldiers in the army’s cavalry, as these men are detailed by Livy (37.40.56) at the battle of Magnesia and 
Polybius (30.25) at the parade at Daphne. Griffith (1935, pp. 155) and Aperghis (2005, p. 200) and many others 
have postulated that this was a unit of cavalrymen, which, while not indicated in the inscription, is entirely 
possible; it may even be that these were a unit of Persian light infantry attached to Timon’s phalangites, as Arrian 
records the inclusion of Persian light soldiers into the phalanx during Alexander’s campaigns (Arrian, Anabasis 7), 
and it remains that this unit of Persian soldiers is decidedly recorded as a part of a military group collectively 
identified as phalangites. Regarding their origin, Ihnken (1978, pp. 121) has argued that Omanes’ men are likely 
connected to the various contingents of Persians stationed in Asia Minor by the Achaemenids, which may have 
continued to operate under Seleukid dominance, a view followed by Billows without argument (1995, 175 n. 84) 
but rejected by Coşkun (forthcoming 2016) who instead suggests that the unit is a product of Seleucus II’s eastern 
campaigning and is only a recent addition to the fort’s occupants. 
70 At least with respect to phalangites and “Macedonians” proper; Grainger (2014, pp. 92-3) has contrasted 
Ptolemy’s diligent recruitment of Macedonian settlers to populate his own military colonies with Seleucus’ 
dependence on the scattered and sparse garrisons left by Antigonus; this deficiency of Macedonian manpower 
was, of course, exacerbated by Seleucus’ lack of access to the Greek mainland for purposes of recruitment (at least 
until 301, when Ipsos gained him access to the Mediterranean coast; see Griffith, 1935, pp. 150-1). Even these 
problems seem enough to render Bar-Kochva’s adherence to the “purity” of the Macedonian ethnic with regard to 
the phalanx untenable, and well beyond Billows’ broad suggestion as such; the city foundations and re-foundations 
conducted by Seleucus I (see Grainger 2014, 93; Griffith, 1935, 148-52) allowed him access to an indigenous 
demographic intended to circumvent the reliance of other Hellenistic forces on Macedonian heavy infantry, and 
there is no reason beyond the lack of direct attestation of his soldier’s Syrian/Iranian descent in the literary sources 
to assume that this resource was established and then fully ignored. Alexander’s need for reinforcement was 
enough to lead to the establishment of the ἐπίγονοι; there was even more need on the part of the Seleucids.  
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differing ethnicities) had included these men, and therefore that these Syrians and Persians 
were present in the Seleukid standing force under other ethnonyms.  
 No inscription details the identity of any members of its association who do not qualify 
as part of their dominant ethnic; thus, the question of the specific identity of these “others” 
who came to be included in these groups still stands. It seems most likely that they were simply 
members of the local population recruited to maintain sufficient strength in the local garrison, 
particularly following campaigns or invasion, but the very nature of this process has obscured 
the identities of these people. Cohen has likened71 the entrance of foreigners into settlers’ 
associations to their eventual entrance into the colonies’ gymnasia, suggesting that such 
organizations existed partially as a way to ensure that new arrivals to a colony adapted to 
Greco-Macedonian culture exclusively rather than bringing in the influence of their own 
customs. Thereby, these associations would have served as a means by which a settler 
population could ensure the survival of its parent culture and identity in a foreign region upon 
which they would come to be dependent for military manpower; it would appear that one 
avenue for the pursuit of this goal was through the maintenance of a military tradition under 
which they had originally arrived. 
                                                          
71 Cohen, 1976, pp. 82. At pp. 36, Cohen places the gymnasium at the center of Hellenistic colonial life—as a 
“repository of Hellenic culture” alongside its normal duties of education and training—largely responsible for 
fostering a sense of “Greekness” among the residents of a colony, supporting this suggestion by citing the 
pervasive presence of the institution among Seleucid colonies. Even in this definitively Greek institution, 
however—and one in fact designed to maintain the separation of Greek and non-Greek—Cohen admits that the 
eventual inclusion of non-Greeks was essentially inevitable, due primarily to demographic necessity but also to 
social pressure. We can deduce from the frequent application of ethnic monikers to military associations, as well 
as their capacity for the maintenance of traditional cultic and military practices, that they served the same 
purpose; the same function of the gymnasia, the maintenance of cultural homogeneity, can be observed in the 
military associations’ adherence to their unit’s traditional esprit de corps. 
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 This assertion finds support in a few additional epigraphic sources which seem to 
reference the preservation of ethno-cultural traditions by various soldiers' associations, 
especially religious practices. Of particular note is the dedication of the Boeotians in Alexandria, 
which clearly demonstrates the continuation of an association’s traditional cultic practices 
despite the inclusion of συμπολιτευόμενοι as demonstrated in SEG II.871 above): 
SEG II.871 An Alexandrian honorific inscription dated to 
the reign of Ptolemy VI (180-145 BCE): 
Διί Βασιλεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἂλλοις πατρίοις θεοῖς. ... To Zeus Basileus and the other ancestral 
gods… 
 
 There are other examples of equal value, such as the following dedicatory inscription 
from Thera by the resident Ptolemaic dynastic cult and one member of the garrison, Diokles, 
which is dedicated to Egyptian deities. This inscription depicts an instance in which an individual 
member of the garrison was personally associated with his association’s broad religious 
position:72 
IG XII 3, 443 A dedicatory inscription by the garrison on 
Thera, dated broadly to the reign of Ptolemy 
III. 
Διοκλῆς καὶ οἱ Βασι[λ]ισταὶ … Σαρὰπι, Ἴσι, 
Ἀνούβι… 
Diokles and the Basilistai… to Osiris, Isis, and 
Anubis… 
 
 There is also a dedicatory inscription to Zeus Soter and Tyche Protogeneia by Philotas of 
Epidamnos, garrison commander of the Ptolemaic garrison at Itanos on Crete. This inscription is 
                                                          
72 For the dating of these inscriptions and their involvement in the broader religious activities of the garrison, see 
Vidman, 1969, 88-91; for further discussion, Chaniotis, 2002, 108-9; Bagnall, 1976, 129; Hallof, Hallof and Habicht, 
1998, 123 n. 84. 
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of particular interest as it demonstrates the impact of a military association’s religious practices 
on the cultic landscape of their occupied territories; it is a personal dedication on behalf only of 
the garrison’s commander, but it appears that the cult of these deities became established 
following the garrison’s presence suggesting their wider worship in the association:73 
OGIS 119 Dedicatory inscription by the commander of 
the garrison at Itanos, ca. 145 BCE.  
Φιλώτας Γενθιου ᾿Επιδαμνιος, χιλίαρχος καὶ 
φρούραρχος, Διὶ Σωτῆρι καὶ Τύχηι 
Πρωτογενήιαι..... 
Philotas of Epidamnos, chiliarch and watch-
commander, to Zeus Soter and Tyche 
Protogeneia… 
 
 Of further note are the dedicatory inscriptions to Zeus Soter (Ἐφ. Ἀρχ., 1911, p. 52, n. 
17) and Athena Nikephoros (IG IV, 1, 1.41) at Aegina which, while not explicitly linked to any 
Pergamene garrison in their respective texts, have been dated to the period immediately 
following the Pergamene occupation and appear directly linked to the presence of Pergamene 
military groups.74 We can therefore see that these associations often practiced cultic devotions 
as a unit, a practice fully understandable in light of Cohen’s interpretation of these bodies as 
not only military in nature but also as a method of maintaining their founders’ original cultural 
orientation. Each of these inscriptions demonstrates the practice of a particular religious cult by 
a military association as a whole, thereby corroborating the assertion that new recruits into 
such organizations would be exposed to an environment in which their cultural practices would 
                                                          
73 For the presence of this cult at Itanos following, and because of, the presence of these foreign soldiers, see 
Spyridakis, 1969, 44. 
74 Launey, 1949, 956. 
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be expected to conform to that of the overall unit (though whether this extended to their 
private lives cannot be said).75 
 The importance placed upon maintaining cultural traditions by these groups also 
provides another perspective on their apparent consistency of battlefield roles. As mentioned, 
it has been a matter of extensive scholarly debate whether the term "Macedonian" in reference 
to the Seleucids' pike phalanx is an ethnonym at all or merely a military designation, but the 
two are neither mutually exclusive nor limited to the Macedonian ethnonym; rather, the 
maintenance of military practices appears to have served as a method by which an association 
of soldiers in general could maintain its traditional sense of identity, just as with other cultural 
phenomena (e.g. cultic practices), not unlike modern military units.76 We know of the 
maintenance of traditional military practice by a unit of Thracian settler-soldiers settled in 
Persia itself up to at least the battle of Raphia, who continued to serve as medium-light infantry 
despite being removed from their traditional geographic origin, and we see the same practice in 
                                                          
75 Cohen, 1976, pp. 74-5. The inscription included at #10 recalls a dedication made by this group on behalf of 
Ptolemy Philometor to Zeus Basileus, along with other deities who are not specifically named. Note that the 
presence of συμπολιτευόμενοι in the group does not, of course, necessitate their direct involvement in the 
worship of a Boeotian deity, but it remains that they are recorded as being a part of a group which actively 
continued to pursue Boeotian cultic practices during their residency in Egypt. Cf. the inscriptions of the garrisons at 
Thera (IG XII 3, 443, 464, cf. Vidman, 1969, 88-91; Launey, 1949, 890; Bagnall, 1976, 124-126), Methana (IG IV, 
854), Athens (IG II 1299), Attalid Aigina and Panion (cf. Chaniotis, 2002, 109; Launey, 1949, 956) for other examples 
of military associations maintaining either traditional religious practices or participation in the ruler cult of their 
founding empire. It does appear that identifying oneself with Macedonian cultural forms served some purpose in 
the improvement of one’s social standing; this would explain certain onomastic anomalies within Grainger’s 
gazetteer of Seleucid subjects, wherein can be found, as an example, the records of a Persian merchant who had 
given Greek names to his children (Grainger, 1997). There is, of course, no way to be certain of his motivations, 
though we may understand the desire of some to escape the tension between those of a Greco-Macedonian 
heritage and the local populaces of the eastern world that is so strongly expressed in the works of several 
Hellenistic poets (especially Meleager). Omanes and his men at Magnesia certainly seemed to benefit from their 
participation, as they had received the same privileges under the Smyrnean treaty as their Hellenic fellows. 
However, this is an issue for which significant discussion would require a degree of consideration well outside the 
scope of this study. 
76 See above, p. 6 n. 13. 
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the unit of "Agrianians" supposedly attached to these Thracians: just as the famed light unit of 
Alexander's forces, these "Agrianians" remained a unit of specialized light infantry, despite 
most likely representing only a pseudo-ethnic moniker by the time of Raphia.77 On this same 
note, the region of Persis also provides the only unit of identified Persians78 reported in service 
in the major campaigns of the Seleucids; yet, we should not see this apparent lack of 
involvement as representative of the extent of Persian participation in the campaigns. Rather, it 
seems more likely that these soldiers of Persis itself, light-armed infantry and bowmen,79 
represent the maintenance of the Persian military tradition of famed archers and light troops—
much like the Agrianians just discussed—and not of the full collection of all Persian manpower 
within the Seleucid force, as the latter would require the Seleucids to have fully ignored one of 
the more significant resources of manpower available to their empire.80  
If even a few of those individual units stationed throughout the Seleucid west—those in 
Syria who would come to form the phalanx in times of campaign81—maintained their own 
tradition and culture as the Boeotians in Egypt or the Agrianians in Persis, then we may be able 
                                                          
77 Polybius 5.79: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ Πέρσαι τοξόται καὶ σφενδονῆται δισχίλιοι. μετὰ δὲ τούτων χίλιοι 
Θρᾷκες, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Μενέδημος Ἀλαβανδεύς. For the armament of these soldiers, see above, n. 48. For the nature 
of the ethnonym applied to the Agrianians, see above, n. 61, and Bar-Kochva, 1976, 50. 
78 Cf. Engels 2013, who considers Polyaenus 7.39-40 evidence of a significant population of Persians within the 
wider Seleucid force. However, I cannot accept this argument as the texts only refer to a declaration on the part of 
Antiochus for the army to observe a Persian holiday (and one further intended specifically to mollify the local 
Persian population); I cannot see the army’s acquiescence to this command as evidence for a present Persian 
military population any more than I can see the Alexandrian Boeotians’ practice of worshipping Hellenic deities as 
evidence that the entire association was comprised of Hellenes (see above, SEG II.871). 
79 The separation of the Thracian soldiers from the main phalanx, coupled with their source in an independent 
military settlement, indicates that they had maintained their traditional armaments and fighting style (or as near 
as could be accomplished), cf. Bar-Kochva , 1976, pp. 33-34. For further discussion of this unit, see above, n. 48. 
80 Bar-Kochva, 1976 pp. 50-1. The presence of Persian soldiers of some description, whether infantry or cavalry, is 
attested in other sources (i.e. OGIS 229), but their only mention in the primary literature is that of Polybius given 
above, wherein they are identified with the light-armed fighting style. 
81 See below, p. 45. 
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to understand an underlying cause for the apparent under-representation of Syrian and Iranian 
soldiers in the Seleucid force: much like Omanes' Persians in Palaemagnesia,82 they would likely 
have employed as units subordinate to a group of phalangites, perhaps identified as 
Macedonian, but almost certainly obscuring their own original ethnic identity as far as most of 
our sources are concerned. 
  
                                                          
82 See above, p. 25. 
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Chapter Three: Reconsidering the Literary Sources 
 Having considered the nature of Seleucid recruitment and its impact on the 
employment of military ethnonyms, we can now effectively reconsider those literary sources 
which had previously informed scholarly opinion on the meaning of ethnonyms in the Seleucid 
army; namely, the accounts of the army’s three major deployments, at the battles of Raphia 
and Magnesia as well as the parade at Daphne. What follows is a brief discussion of each of 
these sources, which remain the most detailed extant accounts of the army’s composition, as 
well as their individual treatment of ethnonyms. These separate discussions will be followed by 
a more detailed treatment of the use of ethnonyms in these sources as a whole. 
 While a few select ethnonyms provided by these sources will be discussed in concert 
with a selection of non-literary evidence to illustrate the disconnection between military 
ethnonyms and genealogy, the primary concern of this chapter are the Seleucid phalangites 
themselves. No other body of soldiers presents such a confusing picture in the literary 
sources—they are sometimes “Macedonians,” sometimes not—and previous scholarly 
discussion of military ethnonyms has centered on these soldiers for that reason.  
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3.1: Polybius and the Battle of Raphia, 217 BCE 
Polybius 5.82 (trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh) Dispositions at the Battle of Raphia 
καὶ τὰς μὲν φάλαγγας ἀμφότεροι καὶ τοὺς 
ἐπιλέκτους τοὺς εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον 
καθωπλισμένους κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀλλήλων 
ἔταξαν… Ἀντίοχος δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἑξήκοντα τῶν 
ἐλεφάντων, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἦν Φίλιππος ὁ σύντροφος 
αὐτοῦ, πρὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος προέστησε, 
καθ᾽ ὃ ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον αὐτὸς ἔμελλε 
πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον: τούτων δὲ 
κατόπιν δισχιλίους μὲν ἱππεῖς τοὺς ὑπ᾽ 
Ἀντίπατρον ταττομένους ἐπέστησε, 
δισχιλίους δ᾽ ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ παρενέβαλε. παρὰ 
δὲ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐν μετώπῳ τοὺς Κρῆτας 
ἔστησε: τούτοις δ᾽ ἑξῆς ἔταξε τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς 
Ἑλλάδος μισθοφόρους: μετὰ δὲ τούτων καὶ 
τῶν εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον 
καθωπλισμένων τοὺς μετὰ Βυττάκου τοῦ 
Μακεδόνος ὄντας πεντακισχιλίους 
παρενέβαλε. τῆς δ᾽ εὐωνύμου τάξεως ἐπ᾽ 
αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ κέρας ἔθηκε δισχιλίους ἱππεῖς, ὧν 
ἡγεῖτο Θεμίσων, παρὰ δὲ τούτους Κάρδακας 
καὶ Λυδοὺς ἀκοντιστάς, ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις τοὺς 
ὑπὸ Μενέδημον εὐζώνους, ὄντας εἰς 
τρισχιλίους, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Κισσίους καὶ 
Μήδους καὶ Καρμανίους, παρὰ δὲ τούτους 
Ἄραβας ἅμα τοῖς προσχώροις, συνάπτοντας 
τῇ φάλαγγι. τὰ δὲ κατάλοιπα τῶν θηρίων τοῦ 
λαιοῦ κέρατος προεβάλετο, τῶν βασιλικῶν 
τινα γεγονότα παίδων ἐπιστήσας Μυΐσκον. 
Both [Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV] formed 
their front of their phalanx and men armed in 
the Macedonian manner… Antiochus also 
placed sixty of his elephants commanded by 
his foster-brother Philip in front of his right 
wing, on which he was to be present 
personally, to fight opposite Ptolemy. Behind 
these he stationed the two thousand cavalry 
commanded by Antipater, and two thousand 
more at right angles to them. In line with the 
cavalry he placed the Cretans, and next them 
the Greek mercenaries; with the latter he 
mixed two thousand of these armed in the 
Macedonian fashion under the command of 
the Macedonian Byttacus. At the extreme 
point of the left wing he placed two thousand 
cavalry under the command of Themison; by 
their side Cardacian and Lydian javelin-men; 
next them the light-armed division of three 
thousand, commanded by Menedemus; then 
the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and by 
their side the Arabians and neighbouring 
peoples who continued the line up to the 
phalanx. The remainder of the elephants he 
placed in front of his left wing under the 
command of Myiscus, one of the boys about 
the court. 
 
 Polybius provides two passages dealing with the strength and composition of the 
participant forces at the battle of Raphia. He first discusses the available forces of both the 
Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies at 5.79, which was included as the opening passage of this study, 
and then at 5.82 describes the dispositions of each army leading to the actual combat; in both 
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instances, he describes the phalangites in the same way: they are καθωπλισμένοι δ᾽ εἰς τὸν 
Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, and no more. This is especially interesting as Polybius does attribute the 
“Macedonian” ethnonym specifically to one of Antiochus’ unit commanders, one “Byttacus,” 
but not to the unit of phalangites specifically. 
 The sources for Polybius’ account of the battle are a matter of question, and there is 
debate surrounding whether they were of a pro-Ptolemaic or pro-Seleucid nature. The detailed 
knowledge Polybius expresses with regard to Ptolemaic preparations for combat certainly 
indicate a Ptolemaic source;83 Zeno of Rhodes is a possibility.84 A pro-Seleucid is evident in the 
harsh treatment of the character of Ptolemy IV,85 though this is not a necessary conclusion; 
Polybius is known to have encountered the work of Ptolemy of Megalopolis,86 and his criticisms 
of Ptolemy’s character may be similarly attributed to him or another disgruntled Ptolemaic 
author. In any case, it remains that there is no firm conclusion in this regard.87 
 There is some difficulty with the numbers Polybius provides for the Ptolemaic force. The 
extent of the native Egyptian involvement with the phalanx is a matter of considerable debate; 
                                                          
83 See the detailed record of Ptolemy’s “secret” military preparations at 5.65-8; also Ptolemy’s personal 
appearance in the battle line at its impact on the soldiers’ morale at 5.85.8. Cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 128. 
84 Cf. Momigliano, 1929, 189. 
85 Polybius characterizes Ptolemy as a lover of luxury and an incapable administrator due to his willful ignorance of 
his kingdom’s foreign territories; see 5.87, 5.34, 5.42, 5.62; for this characterization as indicative of a pro-Seleucid 
source, see Walbank, 1957, 1.613, Otto 1928, 83, and Primo, 2009, 133-35. For an alternative argument which 
attributes these remarks to a Ptolemaic source influenced by dissenting voices in the Ptolemaic court, cf. Fraser, 
1972, 2.144 n.180. 
86 For identification of traces of Ptolemy of Megalopolis’ highly critical history of the Ptolemaic dynasty as a source 
for Polybius’ text, see Walbank, 1.30, 566; 2.493. For the argument of Ptolemy as the source for Polybius’ 
characterization of Ptolemy IV, see Emmet, 1918, X. 
87 We might thereby attribute Polybius’ vague description of the Seleucid phalanx at Raphia to a simple lack of 
knowledge of its composition; yet, he describes the Ptolemaic phalanx in the same manner, albeit with added 
ethnonyms. It remains that, at the very least, he does not confidently assert that the phalangites are 
“Macedonian,” and his doubt is notable. 
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Polybius provides a total number of 25,000 for the phalanx under Ptolemy, and a body of 
20,000 Egyptian soldiers armed as phalangites under the command of one Sosibius.88 These 
units have been variably interpreted as separate bodies, or otherwise as one unit with various 
ethnic designations within.89 At present, suffice it to note that Polybius’ narrative is sufficiently 
unclear as to warrant debate. 
 Polybius provides a variety of ethnonyms associated with the Seleucid force.90 Of 
particular note is his treatment of the light infantry under Menedemus; the cohesive 
deployment of Persians, Agrianes, and Thracians under a single commander has led to the 
belief that these units maintained only pseudo-ethnic designations, which I suggest implies 
their maintenance of a traditional military disposition.91 This is, of course, directly relevant to 
the question of the relationship between military participation and ethnic identity in the 
Seleucid world, as it has been discussed above. 
 Bar-Kochva has used92 Polybius’ confidence that the phalangites were “Macedonians” to 
support the notion that these men were pure-blooded descendants of Greco-Macedonian 
settlers, but in fact Polybius never refers to them as “Macedonians” specifically until the 
                                                          
88 Polybius, 5.65. 
89 For the former, see Bar-Kochva, 1976, 138-40. For the latter, see Mahaffy, 1899, 140-52 and Griffith, 1935, 122-
3; Mahaffy interprets the phalanx as largely Macedonian with only a minority involvement of Egyptian machimoi, 
while Griffith, significantly, argues for 20000 Egyptian soldiers and only 5000 Greco-Macedonians. Bar-Kochva’s 
interpretation of 25000 Greco-Macedonians and 20000 Egyptians is the most directly supported by the text, which 
accounts for a full phalanx of 45000 (albeit with no ethnonym given for the non-Egyptian phalanx), while Griffith’s 
argument for a combined total of 25000 finds strong support in the conduct of the battle itself, which does not 
suggest the sort of overwhelming superiority in heavy manpower that a phalanx of 45000 would have provided 
Ptolemy and thus suggests a misunderstanding on the part of Polybius. 
90 See below, Appendix A. 
91 See above, chapter 2. 
92 Bar-Kochva, 1989, 90. 
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procession at Daphne (30.25) and is otherwise actually quite vague. While Bar-Kochva dismisses 
the genealogical implications of Polybius’ description of the Argyraspides as men “armed in 
Macedonian manner” only (5.79), he ignores that the same descriptor is applied to the phalanx 
as a whole at 5.82. Overall, Polybius does not appear to offer any real information on the 
genealogy of the Seleucid phalangites at Raphia, which will be important in the following 
discussion of the narrative he provides for the procession at Daphne. 
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3.2: Livy and Appian, the Battle of Magnesia (190 BCE) 
Livy, 37.40 (trans. William McDevitte) Dispositions for the Battle of Magnesia 
Regia acies varia magis multis gentibus, 
dissimilitudine armorum auxiliorumque 
erat. decem et sex milia peditum more 
Macedonum armati fuere, qui 
phalangitae appellabantur. haec media 
acies fuit… ad latus dextrum 
phalangitarum mille et quingentos 
Gallograecorum pedites opposuit. his tria 
milia equitum loricatorum—
cataphractos ipsi appellant—adiunxit. 
addita his ala mille ferme equitum; 
agema eam vocabant; Medi erant, lecti 
viri, et eiusdem regionis mixti multarum 
gentium equites. Continens his grex 
sedecim elephantorum est oppositus in 
subsidiis. ab eadem parte, paulum 
producto cornu, regia cohors erat; 
argyraspides a genere armorum 
appellabantur; Dahae deinde, equites 
sagittarii, mille et ducenti; tum levis 
armatura, trium milium, pari ferme 
numero, pars Cretenses, pars Tralles; 
duo milia et quingenti Mysi sagittarii his 
adiuncti erant. Extremum cornu 
claudebant quattuor milia, mixti Cyrtii 
funditores et Elymaei sagittarii. Ab laevo 
cornu phalangitis adiuncti erant 
Gallograeci pedites mille et quingenti et 
similiter his armati duo milia 
Cappadocum—ab Ariarathe missi erant 
regi—; inde auxiliares mixti omnium 
generum, duo milia septingenti, et tria 
milia cataphractorum equitum et mille 
alii equites, regia ala levioribus 
tegumentis suis equorumque, alio haud 
dissimili habitu; Syri plerique erant 
Phrygibus et Lydis immixti. Ante hunc 
equitatum falcatae quadrigae et cameli, 
quos appellant dromadas. His insidebant 
Arabes sagittarii, gladios tenuis habentes 
longos quaterna cubita, ut ex tanta 
The king's [Antiochus III’s] line was more 
chequered with troops of many nations, dissimilar 
both in their persons and armour. There was a 
body of sixteen thousand men armed after the 
manner of the Macedonians, which were called a 
phalanx… On the right side of the phalanx, he 
placed five hundred Gallograecian horsemen. To 
these he joined three thousand horsemen clad in 
complete armour, whom they call Cataphracti, or 
mailed. To these were added a brigade of near a 
thousand horse, which they called Agema. They 
were Medes, all picked men, with a mixture of 
horsemen from many other nations in that part of 
the world. Adjoining hese, a body of sixteen 
elephants was placed in reserve. On the same 
side, a little farther on towards the wing, was the 
royal cohort; these were called Argyraspides, from 
the kind of armour which they wore. Next to these 
stood one thousand two hundred Dahan bowmen 
on horseback; then, three thousand light infantry, 
part Cretans and part Trallians, the number of 
each being equal; adjoining these, were two 
thousand five hundred Mysian archers. Four 
thousand Cyrtaean slingers and Elymaean archers 
mixed together covered the flank of the wing. 
Next to the left flank of the phalanx, stood one 
thousand five hundred Gallograecian horse, and 
two thousand Cappadocians, (which were sent by 
king Ariarathes) wearing the same kind of 
armour; then, auxiliaries of all kinds mixed 
together, two thousand seven hundred; then, 
three thousand mailed horsemen; then, one 
thousand other horsemen, being a royal cohort, 
equipped with lighter coverings for themselves 
and their horses, but, in other respects, not unlike 
the rest; they were mostly Syrians, with a mixture 
of Phrygians and Lydians. In the front of this body 
of cavalry were the chariots armed with scythes, 
and a kind of camels called dromedaries. These 
were ridden by Arabian archers, who carried thin 
swords four cubits long, that they might be able 
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altitudine contingere hostem possent. 
Inde alia multitudo, par ei, quae in 
dextro cornu erat: primi Tarentini, 
deinde Gallograecorum equitum duo 
milia et quingenti, inde Neocretes mille 
et eodem armatu Cares et Cilices mille et 
quingenti et totidem Tralles et quattuor 
milia caetratorum: Pisidae erant et 
Pamphylii et Lycii; tum Cyrtiorum et 
Elymaeorum paria in dextro cornu locatis 
auxilia, et sedecim elephanti modico 
intervallo distantes. 
to reach the enemy from so great a height. Then 
followed another multitude, like that in the right 
wing: first, Tarentines; then, 2500 Gallograecian 
horsemen; then, 1000 new Cretans, and 1500 
Carians and Cilicians, armed in the same manner; 
then, an equal number of Trallians, with 3000 
targeteers (these were Pisidians, Pamphylians, 
and Lycians); then came brigades of Cyrtaeans 
and Elymaeans, equal to the auxiliaries placed on 
the right wing, and sixteen elephants, separated 
by a small interval. 
 
Appian, Syrian War 32 (trans. Horace White) The Armies at the Battle of Magnesia 
ὧδε μὲν δὴ διετετάχατο Ῥωμαῖοι, Ἀντιόχῳ δ᾽ 
ἦν μὲν ὁ στρατὸς ἅπας ἑπτακισμύριοι, καὶ 
τούτων τὸ κράτιστον ἦν ἡ φάλαγξ ἡ 
Μακεδόνων, ἄνδρες ἑξακισχίλιοι καὶ μύριοι, 
ἐς τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου τρόπον ἔτι 
κοσμούμενοι… ἱππεῖς δ᾽ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ 
παρετετάχατο Γαλάται τε κατάφρακτοι καὶ τὸ 
λεγόμενον ἄγημα τῶν Μακεδόνων. εἰσὶ δὲ 
καὶ οἵδε ἱππεῖς ἐπίλεκτοι, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὸ 
ἄγημα λέγεται. τάδε μὲν ἔξ ἴσου τῆς 
φάλαγγος ἦν ἑκατέρωθεν: ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὰ 
κέρατα κατεῖχον ἐν μὲν δεξιᾷ ψιλοί τέ τινες 
καὶ ἕτεροι ἱππεῖς ἀργυράσπιδες καὶ 
ἱπποτοξόται διακόσιοι, τὸ δὲ λαιὸν Γαλατῶν 
τ᾽ ἔθνη, Τεκτοσάγαι τε καὶ Τρόκμοι καὶ 
Τολιστόβοιοι, καὶ Καππαδόκαι τινὲς οὓς 
ἔπεμψεν Ἀριαράθης, καὶ μιγάδες ἄλλοι 
ξένοι, κατάφρακτός τε ἵππος ἐπὶ τοῖσδε 
ἑτέρα, καὶ ἣν ἐκάλουν ἵππον ἑταιρικήν, 
ὡπλισμένη κούφως. ὧδε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος 
ἐξέτασσεν… πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο πλῆθος ἦν 
λιθοβόλων τε καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ ἀκοντιστῶν 
καὶ πελταστῶν, Φρυγῶν τε καὶ Λυκίων καὶ 
Παμφύλων καὶ Πισιδῶν Κρητῶν τε καὶ 
Τραλλιανῶν καὶ Κιλίκων ἐς τὸν Κρητῶν 
τρόπον ἐσκευασμένων. ἱπποτοξόται τε ἐπὶ 
τοῖσδε ἕτεροι, Δᾶαι καὶ Μυσοὶ καὶ Ἐλυμαῖοι 
καὶ Ἄραβες, οἳ καμήλους ὀξυτάτας 
ἐπικαθήμενοι τοξεύουσί τε εὐμαρῶς ἀφ᾽ 
The total force of Antiochus was 70,000 and 
the strongest of these was the Macedonian 
phalanx of 16,000 men, still arrayed after the 
fashion of Alexander and Philip… His horse 
were stationed on either wing, consisting of 
the mail-clad Galatians and the Macedonian 
corps called the agema, so named because 
they were picked horsemen. An equal number 
of these were stationed on either side of the 
phalanx. Besides these the right wing had 
certain light-armed troops, and other 
horsemen with silver shields, and 200 
mounted archers. On the left were the 
Galatian bands of the Tectosagi, the Trocmi, 
the Tolistoboii, and certain Cappadocians 
furnished by king Ariarathes [IV Eusebes], and 
a mingling of other tribes. There was another 
body of horse, mail-clad but light-armed, 
called the Companion cavalry. In this way 
Antiochus drew up his forces… Besides the 
forces enumerated there was a great 
multitude of slingers, archers, javelin 
throwers, and peltasts from Phrygia, Lycia, 
Pamphylia, Pisidia, Crete, Tralles, and Cilicia, 
armed after the Cretan fashion. There were 
also other mounted archers from the Dahae, 
Mysia, Elymais, and Arabia, riding on swift 
dromedaries, who shot arrows with dexterity 
from their high position, and used very long 
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ὑψηλοῦ, καὶ μαχαίραις, ὅτε πλησιάζοιεν, 
ἐπιμήκεσι καὶ στεναῖς χρῶνται. 
δρεπανηφόρα τε ἅρματα ἐν τῷ μεταιχμίῳ, 
προπολεμεῖν τοῦ μετώπου, ἐτετάχατο: καὶ 
εἴρητο αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πεῖραν 
ὑποχωρεῖν. 
thin knives when they came to close combat. 
Antiochus also placed scythe-bearing chariots 
in the space between the armies to begin the 
battle, with orders to retire after the first 
onset. 
 
 Though the passages of Livy and Appian, provided above, are not the only literary 
sources available for the battle of Magnesia,93 they are certainly the most detailed. Both 
sources appear to be based on that of Polybius,94 whose original text is now lost; though the 
two extant texts do diverge, which will be discussed briefly below, they present a largely similar 
account of the battle’s course and the arrangements of its combatants. 
 Both texts number the phalanx at the center of Antiochus’ line at 16,000, though they 
are recorded with a slight difference. For Livy, these men are simply “armed in the manner of 
the Macedonians;” for Appian, they are “Macedonians” proper. Bar-Kochva has argued95 that 
this difference is indicative of their common source, Polybius, referring to the phalanx as “the 
Macedonians,” as Livy would be expected to deny the phalangites’ Macedonian ethnic heritage 
while Appian would have no such motivation. Bar-Kochva’s argument does not hold water; 
while his criticism of Livy’s use of ethnonyms is quite valid, he bases his assertion on the 
premise that Polybius elsewhere refers to the phalanx as “Macedonians” consistently, whereas 
this is not in fact the case as was discussed above with relation to Raphia. In any case, neither 
                                                          
93 There is also Florus (1.24.16-18), Justin (36.8.1-8), and Zonaras (9.20). 
94 Nissen, 1863, 195-7. 
95 Bar-Kochva, 1989, 90-5. 
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author provides any further details as to the composition of the phalanx itself, though both 
provide an extensive list of other units (and other ethnonyms) involved in the army as a whole. 
 The primary point of the texts’ divergence is in their treatment of the Seleucid light 
infantry; Livy places the light troops in two separate bodies on either flank of the main force, 
while Appian combines them into a single list implying their cohesive deployment. Livy’s list is 
commonly preferred, though not universally; in either case, the issue is effectively irrelevant at 
present, as both sources describe the troops themselves in the same manner, and a simple 
misunderstanding of the light soldiers’ deployment by Livy is the likeliest explanation for this 
discrepancy.96 
 Appian’s account is not without mistakes,97 but Livy’s are considerably more telling with 
regard to his treatment of the battle. His account differs strongly from Justin’s, who details the 
rout of a significant portion of the Roman heavy infantry by Antiochus’ cavalry charge;98 Livy’s, 
however, places this charge solely against the small cavalry force on the Roman left.99 Thus, we 
                                                          
96 For arguments in support of Livy’s account, cf. Nissen, 1863, 196; Kromayer, 1922, 2.182-3. For an argument to 
the contrary, cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 166, who attributes confidence in Livy’s account to its interpretation by 
Mommsen (1864-79) and prefers Appian on account of a more realistic depiction of the deployment of Antiochus’ 
light infantry. I follow Bar-Kochva, as a reconstruction of Antiochus’ battle line dependant on Appian’s account 
would represent a more strategically sound Seleucid deployment (Livy’s would involve a counter-deployment of 
light infantry on the right flank against Roman heavy cavalry, a serious mistake on the part of Antiochus); however, 
particulars of the battle itself are of little consequence here. 
97 Bar-Kochva, 1876, 167 n.18 suggests that Appian’s accounting of the number of elephants available to Antiochus 
is a strong overestimation, likely based on a misunderstanding of Polybian material. Goukowsky, 2007, 400-413, 
has enumerated the various inconsistencies between the two accounts (almost entirely to do with where certain 
units are positioned) and follows Briscoe, 1981, 337-358, in preferring the details of Livy’s account. 
98 Justin 31.8: Cum in dexteriore cornu pulsa legio Romana maiore dedecore quam periculo ad castra fugeret, M. 
Aemilius, tribunus militum, ad tutelam castrorum relictus armare se milites suos et extra uallum progredi iubet 
strictisque gladiis fugientibus minari, morituros dicens, ni in proelium reuertantur, infestioraque sua quam hostium 
castra inuenturos. 
99 Livy 42.7-8. Based on Livy’s prior accounting of the forces available to each army and their relative dispositions, 
this version of Antiochus’ charge would represent an assault of 3000 cataphracts and 1200 Dahae against 120 
Roman horsemen, a very improbable use of force. Briscoe, 1981, 350, accepts the account by virtue of Livy’s 
apparent detailed knowledge of the Seleucid dispositions. 
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likely have here a concrete instance of Livy’s pro-Roman bias influencing his reconstruction of 
events; while the specifics of Livy’s reconstruction of the combat are of little importance here, 
the influence of Livy’s personal agenda does extend to his treatment of the army’s ethnics. 
 Livy is the only source to record the participation of Syrians in the Seleucid army, which 
he does with regard to the Seleucid regia ala at the battle of Magnesia at 37.40 (they are “Syri 
plerique… Phrygibus et Lydis immixti…) and the Seleucid force at the battle of Thermopylae 
generally at 36.17.100 This record, however, must be regarded as extremely suspect; Livy’s 
usage of ethnonyms is often a rhetorical device intended to denigrate, especially in regards to 
migrated peoples.101 Moreover, Livy elsewhere applies this terminology to the Seleucids and 
the Macedonians settled in Asia generally, claiming they have “degenerated into Syrians” at 
38.17.11.102 Thus it should be no surprise that the only reference to Syrians given by Livy can be 
                                                          
100 Plutarch does the same at Moralia 197; for an argument for Plutarch’s use of Livy as a source for this chapter, 
see Nissen, 1863, 290. 
101 Livy, through a (likely invented) speech of Manlius Vulso, described the Galatians as “degenerated” due to their 
residence in a “soft” land, having become “Gallograeci” (38.17.9; a similar assertion is also made at 38.49 in a 
speech of Vulso to the senate). 
102 Livy 38.17.11: In Syros… degenerarunt. Further, 36.17: Syri et Asiatici Graeci, vilissima genera hominum et 
servituti nata. The Seleucids are never kings of the Macedonians, but always kings of Syria (as in Periochae XLV); he 
even applies the “Syrian” ethnonym to Seleucid soldiers of the Upper Satrapies, which he even identifies 
otherwise, through the oration of L. Quinctius Flamininus at 35.49: varia enim genera armorum et multa nomina 
gentium inauditarum, Dahas et Medos et Cadusios et Elymaeos, Suros omnes esse, haud paulo mancipiorum melius 
propter servilia ingenia quam militum genus. 
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demonstrably linked to military settlements populated by Macedonians;103 as such, Livy’s 
“Syrians” are of no use in the discussion of ethnonyms within Hellenistic armies.104 
                                                          
103 Bar-Kochva (1989, 92-93.) believes that the Syrians of the Seleucid regia ala must be Greco-Macedonian 
settlers, and that they were likely identified as such in Livy’s source material, because of the unlikelihood of a 
people without an illustrious history as cavalry being elevated to such an elite position within the Seleucid military. 
From a purely military perspective, this is a fair argument, though it rests on no further evidence; however, even 
discounting Bar-Kochva’s position here, Livy’s self-admitted bias against the Syrian ethnicity and other clearly 
spurious and purely derogatory applications of the ethnonym, especially to Seleucid Macedonians, makes this label 
quite suspect as well. 
104 Though Briscoe understands Livy’s use of ethnonyms to be generally genuine and accurate, his position on this 
matter is made through reference to Bar-Kochva and he provides no comment on the controversy surrounding the 
meaning of “Syrian” as applied by Livy in the context of Seleucid soliders. Briscoe, 1981, 349-351. 
 46  
 
3.3: Polybius and the Festival at Daphne (165 BCE) and Some Conclusions on Literary 
 Ethnonyms 
Polybius 30.25 (trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh) “Macedonians” at Daphne 
καθηγοῦντό τινες Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἔχοντες 
καθοπλισμὸν ἐν θώραξιν ἁλυσιδωτοῖς, 
ἄνδρες ἀκμάζοντες ταῖς ἡλικίαις 
πεντακισχίλιοι: μεθ᾽ οὓς Μυσοὶ 
πεντακισχίλιοι. συνεχεῖς δ᾽ ἦσαν Κίλικες εἰς 
τὸν τῶν εὐζώνων τρόπον καθωπλισμένοι 
τρισχίλιοι, χρυσοῦς ἔχοντες στεφάνους. ἐπὶ 
δὲ τούτοις Θρᾷκες τρισχίλιοι καὶ Γαλάται 
πεντακισχίλιοι. τούτοις ἐπέβαλλον 
Μακεδόνες δισμύριοι καὶ χαλκάσπιδες 
πεντακισχίλιοι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀργυράσπιδες… 
… first came some men armed in the Roman 
fashion, with their coats made of chain 
armour, five thousand in the prime of life. 
Next came five thousand Mysians, who were 
followed by three thousand Cilicians armed 
like light infantry, and wearing gold crowns. 
Next to them came three thousand Thracians 
and five thousand Galatians. They were 
followed by twenty thousand Macedonians, 
and five thousand armed with brass shields, 
and others with silver shields… 
 
In contrast to the major engagements of Antiochus III, the army displayed by Antiochus IV at his 
military parade at Daphne presents a few noteworthy distinctions: the strength of its phalanx, 
and the limitations of its ethnic contingents. Antiochus commands the largest recorded host of 
Macedonians—that is to say, soldiers referred to by such an ethnonym specifically—in Seleucid 
military history, and only a few contingents with other specific ethnonyms. Moreover, these 
other contingents—specifically, the Mysians and the Thracians—are valuable examples of the 
application of ethnic terminology to military contingents based on factors other than 
genealogy, as will be discussed below.105 
 We have only Polybius to describe the composition of Antiochus’ army at Daphne; there 
is no way to be certain of the origins of any one contingent or body of included soldiers. The 
context of the event and Polybius’ treatment of it is a matter of rather developed controversy 
                                                          
105 See pages 48-51. 
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and debate;106 for the purposes of the present discussion, Antiochus IV’s intent in the holding of 
such an event is irrelevant at present, as we are concerned only with the ethnonyms provided 
by Polybius within the parade’s context. Having now considered the text of the episode at 
Daphne as well as those at Raphia and Magnesia, we can begin to consider what the ethnonyms 
provided in the parade’s context actually represent. 
 Of first concern are the phalangites themselves; the “Macedonians,” as Polybius calls 
them, and with them the Argyraspides and the bronze-shields. This body of soldiers at Daphne 
presents two interesting distinctions. First, its size; Polybius reports twenty thousand 
Macedonians marching in the procession, compared with the 16000 given by Livy for the battle 
of Magnesia and ten thousand given by Polybius at Raphia, with a further 5000 phalangites at 
least between the silver- and bronze-shield divisions marching in the procession as well. Griffith 
connected107 this seemingly stark expansion of the phalanx with Antiochus IV’s proactive 
campaign of city foundations and refoundations, but this argument was based on Tcherikover’s 
list108 of foundations attributed to Antiochus IV; Tcherikover attributed to Epiphanes fourteen 
foundations, whereas we are now confident in attributing to him only five or six.109  As such, we 
cannot rely on Antiochus IV’s settlement activities as the sole explanation for the size and 
nature of his military force at Daphne. 
                                                          
106 Tarn, famously, regarded the festival as an imitation of a Roman triumph; Tarn, 1938, 529. Sara Johnson has 
convincingly rejected this position, arguing that the festival is fully understandable within purely Hellenistic 
contexts through comparison with the procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus at Alexandria; Johnson, 1993. Andrew 
Erskine has argued that the procession was simply intended as a display of power to reinforce Seleucid authority to 
the many visiting dignitaries; Erskine, 2013 52. 
107 Griffith, 1935, 146-151. 
108 Tcherikover, 1959, 176-80. 
109 Hengel, 1980, 148; Goldstein, 1975, 111-17. 
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 However, we need not account for the size of Antiochus’ phalanx as much as its 
classification. As mentioned above, Antiochus IV’s men are a rarity in Seleucid military history in 
that they are identified as “Macedonians” directly, whereas phalangites are much more 
commonly referred to as “armed in the Macedonian style” only, as we read in accounts of the 
battles at Raphia and Magnesia; it is in this distinction that we may understand its size. In his 
earlier account of the battle of Raphia, Polybius attributes to Antiochus III a phalanx of only 
10000 Macedonians, and these he only labels as “armed in the Macedonian manner” rather 
than providing a firm ethnonym; but these men do not represent the full extent of the phalanx, 
but instead mostly composed the crack “silver shields” unit. The main body of the phalanx itself 
is referred to only as “the multitude,” and it is these soldiers which represent the majority of 
Antiochus III’s core heavy infantry, twenty thousand of them according to Polybius. The phalanx 
at Daphne is not so different, then, other than in how Polybius describes it; the main body of 
the phalanx in both instances is a contingent of men twenty thousand strong, while the 
Argyraspides have shrunk to only five thousand at Daphne (and even this is easily explained by 
the presence of the new “Roman-styled” unit of five thousand picked men110). Thus, the 
importance of Antiochus IV’s phalanx at Daphne is not in the question of its size—it is no larger 
than at Raphia—but rather the question of its “Macedonianness,” and whether its label as such 
bears any meaning or, conversely, whether there is significance to the absence of the 
ethnonym from its predecessors. 
                                                          
110 Sekunda, 1994, 16. 
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 Bar-Kochva calculated111 the strength of the Seleucids’ potential manpower in the west 
at about twenty-five or thirty thousand men at the time of Daphne; this is purely with reference 
to phalangite heavy infantry. He based this calculation on the resources provided by the 
communities of Greco-Macedonian military settlers in Syria, and he provided it to support the 
argument that the phalanx at Daphne did not contain native Syrians; as the phalanx presented 
only twenty thousand men, he argued, we need not assume that it drew on any sources of 
manpower beyond the military colonies, whose sole purpose was to fill its ranks, as these were 
plentiful enough to supply it in full. Furthermore, he stresses, Polybius refers to the phalangites 
as "Macedonians," and not more broadly as simply phalangites or only as men "armed like 
Macedonians." As Polybius had used this broader terminology in other situations when armies 
included phalangites who were certainly not entirely Greco-Macedonian,112 says Bar-Kochva, 
Polybius’ terminology surely implies that the phalangites at Daphne were fully composed of 
genealogical Greco-Macedonians. 
 But this assertion places too much weight in Polybius' choice of terminology. Though the 
phalangites at Daphne are specifically referred to as Macedonians, and Polybius otherwise 
refers to "mixed" phalanxes much more broadly, we saw above that Polybius' account of the 
battle of Raphia refers to the main body of Seleucid heavies only as "the multitude of 
phalangites." In that earlier account, Polybius applied no ethnonym to the phalanx at all despite 
his application of specific ethnonyms to other national contingents. Therefore, unless we are to 
                                                          
111 Bar-Kochva, 1989, 92-103. 
112 Polybius 5.53: τούτοις δὲ παρέθηκε τοὺς συμμαχικοὺς Κρῆτας, ὧν εἴχοντο Γαλάται Ῥιγόσαγες: παρὰ δὲ τούτους 
ἔθηκε τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ξένους καὶ μισθοφόρους, οἷς ἑπόμενον παρενέβαλε τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος σύστημα. (… 
next to them, he positioned the Cretan allies and next them the Galatian Rhigosages. After these he placed the 
mercenaries from Greece and last of all the many divisions of the phalanx.) 
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believe that the military colonies which supplied the phalanx at Daphne were entirely inactive 
at the Battle of Raphia, it seems that we can actually discern very little from Polybius' choice of 
ethnonym for the phalanx; he not only refers to the same body of men differently on different 
occasions, but this same body is also labelled differently in the works of other authors. 
 Perhaps more important, however, is that.  Bar-Kochva assumed Polybius based his use 
of ethnonyms on military units which maintained genealogically-based ethnonyms themselves. 
We have seen in the two chapters above that exactly this system of recruitment conversely 
produced military units whose ethnonyms had no definitive correlation with the genealogies of 
their membership. Beyond these, we have discussed above the implications of a few instances 
wherein we can discern, papyrologically, that soldiers could be identified with one ethnic early 
in their careers and then exchange this ethnonym for another upon promotion, including 
“Macedonian.”113 Though the only instances of this phenomenon that we know of are 
Ptolemaic, the point remains that the existence of these examples must give us caution when 
considering the veracity of the Macedonian ethnonym in military contexts. 
 As mentioned above, the Mysians are an especially noteworthy inclusion in the 
procession, and this is because of the political situation between their homeland and the 
Seleucid Empire at the time of the procession. Specifically, the treaty of Apamea following his 
predecessor’s defeat should have forbidden Antiochus IV from recruiting Mysians at all, as they 
originate from within the Roman sphere of influence in Asia Minor;114 we should expect to find 
                                                          
113 See above, p. 26; Launey, 1949, 325-6. 
114 The treaty of Apamea forbade the Seleucid kings from recruiting any forces from west of the Taurus Mountains; 
App. Syr. 39. 
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these soldiers under Pergamene employ, not Seleucid. There are a few explanations available; 
Griffith theorized115 that the northern lands of Asia Minor were regarded as independent and 
exempt from the treaty’s restrictions, allowing Syrian recruiters to gather Mysians freely. By 
contrast, Nikolas Sekunda has reasoned116 that Eumenes II’s prior support of Antiochus IV 
makes a Pergamene origin for these soldiers the most likely scenario. However, it would seem 
to me that the most plausible explanation is Launey’s117; that these men did not march from 
Asia Minor at all, but rather represented a regular military contingent resupplied with fresh 
recruits from within Seleucid borders. 
 While Launey’s theory was speculative at the time, we have now seen several other 
examples of ethnonyms denoting a military unit based well outside its namesake homeland. 
Admittedly, there is no evidence for this practice on the part of Mysians outside a few 
references to Mysian settlers in the army of Molon,118 but there is evidence of the use of the 
“Mysian” ethnonym referring to a military contingent rather than a place of origin. A few extant 
receipts from the Fayyum that detail exchanges of land,119 recently discussed by Colleen 
Fischer-Bovet,120 recall the advancement of the career of one Theotimos, a Ptolemaic soldier 
who begins his career under the ethnic “Persian” and transitions into a “Mysian” cavalryman 
upon his receipt of a land grant. Though this particular case is Ptolemaic, it should still give us 
                                                          
115 Griffith, 1935, 147. 
116 Sekunda, 1994, 16-17. 
117 Launey, 1949, 436-49; also Walbank, 1957, 449 and Sion-Jenkins, 2001, 27. 
118 Polybius, 5.77: προελθὼν δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Λύκον ποταμὸν προῆγεν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Μυσῶν 
κατοικίας, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γενόμενος ἧκε πρὸς Καρσέας... (Continuing and crossing the Lycus river he advanced on 
the Mysian colonies, and after having dealt with them reached Carseae...) 
119 P.Fay. 11 and 12 (115 BCE and 103 BCE respectively); PP 2793. 
120 Fischer-Bovet, 2008, 87-8. 
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pause to consider that the ethnonym in question appears related to an established military 
unit, and not descent or simply a style of armament. 
 Like the Mysians, the Thracians are no stranger to inclusion in Seleucid forces. There 
were between one and three thousand of them in Antiochus III’s army at Raphia, and the same 
amount at Magnesia. Bar-Kochva concluded121 that the presence of three thousand Thracians 
at Daphne was further evidence of Antiochus’ disregard for the provisions of the treaty of 
Apamea as they must have originated from west of the Taurus, but this is not necessarily the 
case. Thracians, in fact, play a ubiquitous role in a variety of Hellenistic military engagements, 
as we have seen, and we know of several locales outside of Asia Minor where Thracian military 
colonists had settled. Polyaenus describes122 the Seleucid military settlement in Persia as 
inclusive of Thracians, an assertion corroborated by Polybius’ description of the Persian archers 
at Raphia as serving under the same commander as a Thracian contingent, as discussed above. 
Furthermore, we have already seen that there was an established association of Thracian 
soldiers on Cyprus, and this group provides us with an important consideration: despite their 
maintenance of the Thracian ethnonym, they appear to have included people of differing 
ethnicities eventually, as their dedicatory inscriptions provide reference to their admittance of 
cohabitants (likely local Cypriots) into their ranks. Thus, the Cypriot Thracians have 
demonstrated that their ethnic designation, much like that of the Mysians discussed above, 
could well apply not only to a style of armament or directly to an ethnic origin, but also to one’s 
                                                          
121 Bar-Kochva, 1989, 306. 
122 Polyaenus 7.39: ...ἐνταῦθα Μακεδόνων καὶ Θρᾳκῶν ἱππεῖς τριακοσίους, ὁπλίτας τρισχιλίους ἀποκρύφας 
συνέταξεν... (… There [Cheiles] stationed three hundred Macedonian and Thracian cavalrymen, along with three 
thousand heavy-armed troops…) 
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participation in an established military organization; that one could be a “Thracian” by being 
accepted into and serving with a unit of other “Thracians” and not only by actually coming from 
Thrace or as easily as fighting with a rhomphaia. 
 Thus, we can see that the “Macedonians” involved in the various major Seleucid military 
engagements are attested in conflicting manners across our literary sources. Furthermore, 
there is evidence for several Seleucid military units maintaining an ethnic designation, yet 
recruiting members of various ethnicities, along with evidence of soldiers elsewhere in the 
Hellenistic world transitioning from one ethnic to another by virtue of military promotion. Thus, 
I would contend that what little we do know of ethnonyms and their application to military 
settlers should bring any literary ethnic identification in a military context into question. We 
simply cannot know from where the Mysians of Daphne came; that they are associated with 
such an ethnonym should give us no reason to expect of them an origin in Asia Minor. 
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Conclusion 
At this point, I would assert that the self-administered military associations which 
served as a resource of effective manpower for the core Seleucid military developed into 
effectively multi-ethnic organizations despite their self-identification with particular origins. If 
this conclusion is plausible, then we might understand why Appian and (occasionally) Polybius 
label the Seleucid phalangites simply as “Macedonians,” as they would presumably have been 
composed of several units from several associations which may very well have self-identified as 
(and, therefore, been recorded as) Macedonian, just as nearly every other unit in the Seleucid 
roll calls receives only a single ethnic label by way of identification. Furthermore, this may offer 
an explanation for Livy’s complete avoidance of ethnic terminology regarding the phalanx at 
the battle of Magnesia, as it may well have been a conglomeration of numerous ethnicities 
drawn both from the local populations of each association’s parent city and the descendants of 
the Macedonian military settlers themselves. That the phalanx may have been organized in this 
way should not surprise us: when Alexander created the ἐπίγονοι, Arrian123 tells us that these 
foreign soldiers were also divided into units with Macedonian organizational names.  
One of the original goals of this study was to determine a reason for the absence of 
Syrians and Persians in the Seleucid military lists presented by our extant historiographers; 
while no “smoking gun” has been found on this account, it would appear to be possible that 
these ethnic groups were, at some point, involved in other ethnically-identified units within the 
Seleucid military, and that such access brought with it association with these other identities 
                                                          
123 Arrian, Anabasis 7.11. 
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themselves. Although we cannot point to any direct evidence of Syrian interaction with 
Hellenistic military associations, we have seen that organized associations of soldiers served as 
route by which local peoples could become connected to a foreign ethnic identity. We have 
seen that Hellenistic armies in general—including the Seleucid—appear to have relied at least 
in part on garrison forces established in military associations stationed in individual cities, and 
that these associations often identified themselves with reference to a single ethnic despite the 
inclusion of members from different ethnicities. We have also seen that the literary evidence 
used to support the understanding of the core Seleucid phalanx as homogenously Macedonian 
is misunderstood at best, and contradictory at worst. Therefore, it would appear that the 
recruitment system for the Seleucid military produced soldiers who could potentially (and very 
likely) have been identified with (effectively) any ethnonym, as they would become associated 
with such labels primarily by virtue of the units in which they served, and in particular, the 
traditions which those units had preserved. Recognizing this phenomenon may provide us with 
an explanation for the apparent absence of Syrian and Persian soldiers in the Seleucid military: 
they may well have been present, but were simply identified with the other soldiers beside 
whom they fought. 
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Appendix A: Ethnonyms in the Seleucid Army 
 Presented here, for reference, is a collection of the ethnonyms provided by our main 
literary sources on the composition of the Seleucid army (Polybius, Livy and Appian) in each of 
the three primary episodes in which this information is given (namely the battles of Raphia and 
Magnesia, as well as the procession of Antiochus IV at Daphne). 
 The ethnonyms are organized below, first in a simple and all-inclusive alphabetical list, 
followed by a succinct list of the ethnonyms given in each primary episode by year, illustrating 
the development of the Seleucid military’s ethnic composition as it is recounted by our sources 
from Raphia to Daphne. Finally, they are presented again, organized per episode, but with the 
details surrounding their role and organization within the Seleucid force also provided to 
facilitate a clearer depiction of each unit’s composition and extent of involvement with the 
Seleucid force. 
 Of course, of primary note is the complete absence of any direct reference to 
“Macedonians” in any source until the procession at Daphne, as well as the declining 
involvement of Greek mercenaries following the battle at Raphia. Also noteworthy is the 
considerably less varied list of ethnonyms provided for the Daphne parade, coinciding with the 
introduction of the Macedonian ethnonym proper (and in significant number). 
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A.1: Seleucid Military Ethnonyms Organized by Reference Year 
217 BCE (Raphia, as per 
Polybius 5.79 & 5.82)): 
 
190 BCE (Magnesia, as per 
Livy 37.40): 
 
166/5 BCE (Daphne, as per 
Polybius 30.25): 
 
Agrianians, Arabs, Cadusians, 
Carmanians, Cilicians, 
Cissians, Cretans, Greeks, 
Lydians, Medes, Persians 
 
Arabians, Cappadocians, 
Carians, Cilicians, Cretans, 
Cyrtians, Dahae, Elymians, 
Galatians (Gallograeci), 
Lycians, Lydians, Mysians, 
Pisidians, Phrygians, 
Tarentines, Thracians. 
 
Cilicians, Galatians (Gauls), 
Macedonians, Mysians, 
Nisaeans, Thracians 
 
 
A.2: Seleucid Military Ethnonyms Organized by Military Role (including unnamed contingents) 
Battle of Raphia (Polybius, 5.79, 82) 
 
Ethnonyms: Non-specified 
contingents: 
Arabs: 10000 soldiers (unclassified). 
Agrianians, Persians, Thracians: 3000 archers, slingers, and other 
light-armed. 
Cadusians, Carmanians, Cissians, Medes: 5000 soldiers (unclassified). 
Carmanians, Cilicans, Dahae: 5000 light-armed soldiers. 
Cretans: 2500 soldiers (unclassified; likely but not certainly light 
infantry or  archers, also including “Neocretans”) 
Lydians: 500 soldiers (unclassified). 
 
Cardaces: 1000. 
Argyraspides and 
other “soldiers 
in the 
Macedonian 
style:” 10000. 
“The Multitude of the 
Phalangites:” 
20000. 
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Battle of Magnesia (Livy 37.40) 
Ethnonyms 
Arabians: Cavalry (unquantified). 
Cappadocians: 2000 soldiers (unclassified). 
Carians, Cilicians: 1500 soldiers (unclassified). 
Cretans, Thracians: 3000 soldiers (unclassified, but likely light infantry). 
“Neocretans:” Unquantified and unclassified, but this time separate from the Cretans proper. 
Cyrtians (Kurds124) and Elymians: 4000 soldiers, grouped despite differing battlefield roles 
(slingers and cavalry respectively; this may represent a simple peculiarity of the text, 
but is not impossible in practice). 
Dahae: 1200 missile cavalry. 
Galatians: 5500 Cavalry (in two units of 1500, one on each wing, and one further unit of 
2500).125 
Lydians: Unquantified, unclassified. 
Mysians: 2500 Soldiers (unclassified). 
Phrygians: Unquantified, unclassified. 
Pisidians, Pamphylians, Lycians: 3000 soldiers (unclassified). 
Tarentines: Unquantified, unclassified. 
Thracians: 1500 Soldiers, listed separately from those organized with the Cretans above. 
 
Non-specified contingents 
“Mixed auxiliaries:” 2700. 
Cataphracts: 3000. 
Argyraspides: Unquantified. 
“Phalangites:” 16000. 
 
 
Procession at Daphne (Polybius 30.25) 
Ethnonyms: Non-specified contingents: 
Cilicians: 3000 light-armed soldiers. 
Galatians (Gauls): 5000 Soldiers (unclassified). 
Macedonians: 20000 heavy infantry. 
Mysians: 5000 Soldiers (unclassified). 
Nisaeans: 1000 cavalry. 
Thracians: 3000 soldiers (unclassified; likely light 
infantry). 
Argyraspides: “Some.” 
Bronze Shields: 5000. 
Cataphracts: 1500. 
“Citizen cavalry:” 3000 
Elite cavalry (Agema; Companions): 4000. 
Infantry “armed in the Roman style:” 
5000. 
  
                                                          
124 Potts, 2014, 111. 
125 There is some disagreement over the number of Galatians in the battle line, possibly indicated a conflation of 
various units in Polybius’ text by Appian or a double-counting of some by Livy the number may be between 1-2 
thousand too high here. Cf. Griffith, 1935, 145-6. 
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